












DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC 


































N° 209                                   August 2004 
The link between product market reform  
and macro-economic performance 
by  






Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, or by experts working in association with them. 
The "Papers" are intended to increase awareness of the technical work being done 
by the staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further analyses. Views 
expressed represent exclusively the positions of the author and do not necessarily 
correspond to those of the European Commission. Comments and enquiries 
should be addressed to the: 
 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Publications 
BU1 - -1/180 






1 This study was commissioned by the Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs to the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) under the reference ECFIN-
E/2002/002. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the 
























©European Communities, 2004  
  - 2 -
Table of Contents 
 
1  Summary..........................................................................................................4 
2  Introduction.....................................................................................................8 
3  Literature review and discussion of existing empirical work....................11 
3.1 Allocative  efficiency..................................................................................................... 11 
3.2 Productive  efficiency.................................................................................................... 13 
3.3 Dynamic  efficiency....................................................................................................... 16 
3.4  Overall growth impact.................................................................................................. 19 
3.5  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)...................................................................................... 21 
3.6  Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003)................................................... 26 
3.7  Card and Freeman (2003) ............................................................................................. 27 
4  Modelling strategy.........................................................................................29 
4.1  Measuring the markup.................................................................................................. 35 
4.2 Macroeconomic  performance....................................................................................... 41 
5  Aggregate economy.......................................................................................51 
5.1  Product market reforms................................................................................................. 51 
5.1.1  Ease of starting a new business............................................................................. 52 
5.1.2 Trade.....................................................................................................................5 5  
5.1.3  State involvement in the economy........................................................................ 57 
5.1.4  Administrative burden on business....................................................................... 61 
5.1.5 Other  controls........................................................................................................ 62 
5.1.6  Relationship between these indicators and Single Market Program..................... 64 
5.2  Impact of product market reforms on performance...................................................... 65 
5.2.1  Product market reforms and the mark-up in the total business sector.................. 65 
5.2.2 Employment.......................................................................................................... 68 
5.2.3 Investment............................................................................................................. 72  
  - 3 -
5.2.4  Comparison with QUEST..................................................................................... 74 
5.2.5 R&D...................................................................................................................... 76 
5.2.6 Labour  productivity .............................................................................................. 78 
5.2.7  Growth of Labour Productivity............................................................................. 87 
5.2.8  Total Factor Productivity...................................................................................... 93 
5.2.9  Manufacturing and services.................................................................................. 96 
6  Summary and conclusions..........................................................................105 
References...........................................................................................................108 
Appendix A: TFP...............................................................................................113 
Appendix B: Data availability...........................................................................117 
Appendix C: Further econometric results.......................................................119 
Eurostat structural indicators .............................................................................................. 119 
Robustness in aggregate economy...................................................................................... 121 
Robustness in manufacturing and service sectors............................................................... 124 
Appendix D: Network industries......................................................................127 
D.1 Electricity, gas and water.................................................................................................127 
D.1.1 Electricity deregulation............................................................................................. 127 
D.1.2 Gas ............................................................................................................................ 135 
D.1.3 Water......................................................................................................................... 136 
D.1.4 Impact of reforms on performance in Electricity, Water and Gas............................ 136 
D.2 Telecommunications and postal services......................................................................... 144 
D.2.1 Telecommunications deregulation............................................................................ 144 
D.2.2 Postal services deregulation...................................................................................... 148 
D.2.3 Impact of reforms on performance in telecommunications and postal services....... 149 
 
  
  - 4 -
1  Summary 
Value-added per capita in EU countries has lagged behind the US. This is despite widespread 
reforms to product markets across EU countries aimed at increasing growth. This study analyses 
the macro-economic impact of product market reforms undertaken in the European Union over 
the 1980s and 1990s. Theory suggests that product market reforms should enhance growth, 
although the impact may vary across countries and may take time. On the whole empirical work 
has pointed to a positive impact of more liberal regulation and product market reforms on 
growth, although this is by no means a robust finding. In addition, many papers have highlighted 
the fact that there may be distributional consequences with some countries, industries or 
individuals losing out. The resulting adjustment process, as plants shut down and workers are 
displaced, may be lengthy. Productivity levels in some countries could fall, although from a 
world-wide perspective this results in an increase in allocative efficiency. Where the impact of 
reforms is to increase total employment this may result in a fall in productivity, particularly in 
the short run, as less productive workers are brought into the labour force. 
In this work we consider a large number of regulations and reforms across EU countries. Our 
main methodology is a two-stage approach. The channel we investigate is one in which the level 
of rents is a key determinant of factor demands and incentives for efficiency enhancement and 
innovation. We focus on this channel because we believe that the literature highlights this as the 
main channel by which product market reforms affect macro-economic outcomes. We first 
estimate the relationship between product market reforms and the level of economic rents in the 
economy and in manufacturing and services. We then estimate the relationship between the level 
of economic rents and aspects of macroeconomic performance, using our indicators of product 
market reform as instruments for the mark-up. We thus control for possible endogeneity of the 
mark-up due to shocks that affect rents and macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously. 
This method captures the impact of product market reforms on competition and the impact of 
competition on allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency, and includes the impact of  
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competition on both innovation and imitation, as measured by R&D expenditure and total factor 
productivity. We do not capture returns to scale. 
We show that product market reforms that ease entry, reduce tariff rates and regulatory barriers 
kahto trade, remove price controls, and reduce public involvement in production affect the 
average level of economic rents in the economy in diverse ways. Reforms to labour and credit 
markets are associated with reductions in the level of economic rents available. Our empirical 
results show that the level of economic rents is negatively associated with employment and 
investment, or in other words greater competition is associated with higher levels of employment 
and investment, particularly in the service sector. These results accord with theoretical 
predictions. Increases in competition bring prices closer to marginal costs, increasing output 
demanded and thus leading to increases in factor demands. 
We find that regulatory reforms that have reduced the level of economic rents appear to be 
associated with lower levels of labour and total factor productivity. In addition, while there 
appears to be a non-linear relationship between the level of economic rents and levels of R&D 
expenditure and growth rates of labour and total factor productivity, most countries appear to 
have levels of economic rents where a reduction in rents is associated with a reduction in R&D 
and growth rates. This is identified by looking at changes over time within countries. When we 
look at average differences across countries we see the opposite – countries with lower average 
levels of rents are those that have higher productivity, TFP and R&D investment. Interpreting 
these results is, however, problematic as we can not identify the impact of the average level of 
rents across countries from the impact of other characteristics of countries that we do not 
observe. There are a number of reasons why we would recommend caution in interpretation – 
some to do with possible measurement issues, others to do with timing and dynamics.  
First, this association is obtained from a within-groups estimator, so it is identified from 
differences in the relative time series variation within countries. When we look at the between, or 
cross-section, relationship we see that countries with lower levels of markups (higher levels of 
competition) have higher growth rates of productivity. The problem with the latter result is that  
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we are not able to control for other differences across countries which may be correlated with 
product market regulations. For example, it might be that countries which had low levels of 
product market regulation were also countries that had better education systems, and this was 
associated with faster productivity growth.  
Secondly, there are many challenges in measuring the objects of interest (labour and total factor 
productivity as well as the degree of competition) correctly both within several sectors of the 
economy (particularly services) and also obtaining comparable measures across countries. The 
main problems are the correct measurement of prices to reflect both variation in firms’ market 
position and in the quality of the products produced, and are well recognised in the literature and 
by most national statistical agencies.
1 In addition, comparing the level of competition across 
countries is difficult due to differences in data collection and measurement. Some of these 
difficulties are lessened by looking at changes over time within countries, although this does not 
alleviate all the problems. 
Thirdly, it is also likely that dynamic processes are important here, and with the limited time 
series of data we have available to us we have not been able to fully investigate these. For 
example, the literature emphasises the fact that adjustment costs in R&D are high (higher than 
for general employment or physical capital)
2 and it may take firms and others a long time to 
adjust to change. In addition, there are a number of difficulties in identifying the impact of such 
large scale reforms across heterogeneous countries which were experiencing different economic 
conditions.  
In an appendix we also look at the impact of privatization and liberalization in network industries 
(electricity and telecommunications) and find that reforms were associated with reductions in 
employment and increases in labour productivity in these industries. 
                                                 
1 The US puts considerable effort into correcting prices indices, e.g. for computers. A discussion of the main issues 
is contained in an Appendix to this report, and see Griliches (1998) for further discussion 
2 See, inter alia, Hall (1993).  
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For many of the problems that we encounter micro data would help; micro data would allow us 
to model some of the dynamic processes, though here longer time series are what is really 
needed (and here the problem is not only data collection, but the extent and variability of reform 
across countries).  Micro data helps to deal with many aspects of heterogeneity, as well as many, 
though not all, of the measurement issues. Micro data is certainly needed to capture the 
complexity of mechanisms for regulating network industries. 
The very different experiences of different countries that we document raise the question of 
whether it is possible to impose a common structure across different countries. Essentially we 
should ask whether the experience of other EU countries is a suitable counterfactual for 
estimating the effects of changes in any particular country. An alternative strategy would be to 
look at firms or industries within a country that were affected by the reforms and compare their 
performance to those that were not affected, or to pick relevant groups of countries which share 
similar characteristics to act as controls. 
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2  Introduction 
Value-added per capita in EU countries has lagged behind the US (see Figure 1). This is despite 
widespread reforms to product markets across EU countries aimed at increasing growth.
3 The 
purpose of this study is to analyse empirical evidence on the macro-economic impact of product 
market regulation and reforms undertaken in the European Union over the last decade. We do 
this using data for twelve EU countries




























Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Italy Netherlands
Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom
United States  
Figure 1: Value-added per capita. 
Source: Author’s calculations using OECD data. Value-added is in 1995 US dollars using deflators and PPP exchange rates.  
 
Theory suggests that product market reforms should have a positive impact on allocative 
efficiency by bringing prices more in line with marginal costs and by driving less efficient firms 
out of the market. Productive efficiency may be improved by reducing slack and encouraging 
firms to cut fat. Opening up of markets may yield increases in productivity through returns to 
                                                 
3 See, for example, EU (2003). 
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
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scale and also change opportunities for technology transfer and affect the rate of adoption of new 
technologies. The impact on dynamic efficiency is the hardest to pin down and it is not clear in 
which direction it will go. One the one hand tougher competition provides incentives for firms to 
innovate in order to escape competition, on the other hand in less competitive markets rents are 
higher so the potential returns from innovation are higher. In addition, the impact of product 
market regulations and reforms is likely to differ across countries and industries depending on a 
number of factors including the current state of technology and other regulatory institutions. 
The empirical literature has not been able to distinguish all of these separate affect. On the whole 
empirical work has pointed to an overall positive impact of more liberal regulation and product 
market reforms on growth, although this is by no means a robust finding. In addition, many 
papers have highlighted the fact that there may be distributional consequences with some 
countries, industries or individuals losing out, e.g. countries or industries far from the 
technological frontier. The resulting adjustment process, as plants shut down and workers are 
displaced, may be lengthy. Productivity levels in some countries could fall (if their comparative 
advantage is in lower productivity sectors), although from a world-wide perspective this results 
in an increase in allocative efficiency. 
Our approach is motivated by recent theoretical and empirical work.
5 We consider a large 
number of regulations and reforms across EU countries over the period 1986-2000. The reforms 
we focus on include changes to public procurement policies, privatizations (moving ownership 
from public to private sector), legal and administrative barriers to entry, barriers to trade, 
regulation and liberalisation of network industries. 
The theoretical literature points to the level of rents as the main mechanism by which product 
market regulations and reforms affect performance. Competition enhancing reforms reduce rents. 
This brings prices more in line with marginal costs, affects managers and workers incentives to 
                                                 
5 These include Aghion et al (2002), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), Alesina et al (2003) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2003).  
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operate efficiently and affects firms’ incentives to invest in activities that will increase their 
ability to capture rents in future.  
We therefore begin our analysis by examining the relationship between a large number of 
reforms and a measure of rents. This is an important first step and one that much of the existing 
empirical literature omits. The impact of product market reforms is heterogeneous and a priori 
restrictions imposed by aggregating reforms into a single index can provide misleading results. 
In addition, this analysis highlights the important identification problem that all empirical work 
in this area faces (but which not all papers discuss). In order to produce econometric estimates 
that identify the key parameters of interest from other cross country differences we need to have 
indicators of product market regulations and reforms that vary differentially over time across 
countries or industries. These do not always exist – both because many regulations are similar 
across countries and many reforms happened around the same time. We adopt a strategy to 
identify the parameters of interest that is valid under certain assumptions (which are spelled out). 
We find that there is great variation in the impact of different regulations or reforms, pointing to 
the problems with using a simple single index to capture the range of regulations and reforms. 
Macro-economic performance is measured by growth in output per worker. This can be 
decomposed into total factor productivity (TFP), factor accumulation and changes in the quality 
of factors. We estimate the impact of product market reforms on these performance indicators 
both through affecting the level of economic rents available in the economy and, as a robustness 
check, directly. 
The structure of this report is as follows. The next section provides a review of the relevant 
economics literature. In section 4 we describe our methodology and give a broad picture of 
macro economic performance in EU countries. In section 5 we consider product market reforms 
and their relationship to performance, and section 6 concludes and provides some pointers for 
future work in this area. In the Appendix we consider the process of regulatory change in 
network industries over the past fifteen years and how these relate to employment, investment 
and productivity measures.  
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3  Literature review and discussion of existing empirical work 
This section discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on channels through which product 
market regulations and reforms impact on macroeconomic performance. There are a large 
number of literatures which are relevant to the topic. It is beyond the scope of this report to 
review all of them. For example, TFP measurement and growth accounting, business cycles and 
adjustment processes would all be of interest in a more comprehensive study. We focus on the 
literature that deals directly with channels through which product market regulations and reforms 
impact on performance. 
Theoretical models suggest that regulations and reforms which liberalise or improve the working 
of product markets, or which move assets from public to private ownership, can affect macro 
economic performance in a number of ways. Following the Commission’s suggestion, we 
discuss these under the headings of allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, dynamic 
efficiency and impact on overall growth. Three empirical papers that we consider as particularly 
relevant to this study are discussed separately, these are Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Card and 
Freeman (2003) and Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003).  
3.1  Allocative efficiency 
Reforms that lead to more competitive product markets (reduce rents) bring prices more in line 
with marginal costs and this will mean that the allocation of goods is more efficient. However, in 
network industries where cost structures create a tendency towards natural monopolies, it is not 
necessarily lower levels of regulation that will result in prices closer to marginal cost. In these 
cases the nature and quality of regulation may be more important than its level. 
More product market competition can lead to increased allocative efficiency as lower 
productivity firms exit and market share moves from lower productivity to higher productivity 
firms. This means that inputs (labour, capital) are allocated more efficiently. Trade liberalisation 
exposes firms to foreign competition forcing exit of high cost producers and shifting market  
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share to low cost producers. However, the resulting adjustment process, as plants shut down and 
workers are displaced, may be lengthy. Low cost producers may be located in other countries so 
individual countries and industries can gain or lose from this process.  
Two recent theoretical papers that focus on reallocation effects of liberalisation are Melitz (2003) 
and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001). Melitz (2003) specifies a model with imperfect competition 
and heterogeneous firms in which opening to trade leads to reallocation of resources within 
industries towards more productive firms. Low productivity firms exit, high productivity firms 
expand in the domestic market and some enter the export market. This leads to an increase in 
aggregate productivity, even when there is no productivity growth within firms. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) consider the impact of product and labour market regulations in 
the context of a model in which firm and employee productivity is fixed and in which there is 
only one factor of production (labour). Reforms to product markets reduce and redistribute the 
economic rents that accrue to economic agents (owners of capital and workers). In their model 
deregulation of product markets can take the form of increased substitutability between goods or 
a reduction in entry costs. In the short run, when the number of firms is fixed, increased 
substitutability between goods leads to lower mark ups, reduced unemployment and higher real 
wages. In the long run firms exit due to the lower level of rents, and as a result mark ups, 
unemployment and real wages return towards their original levels. This dimension of product 
market deregulation is thus eventually self-defeating. Reducing entry barriers has an effect in the 
long run - it leads to lower mark ups, lower unemployment and higher real wages. There are 
three things we take from this stylised model. First, even in a model where productivity does not 
change over time, reforms have different expected effects in the short and the long runs. Second, 
the impact of increasing product market competition may be muted if entry is not possible. 
Third, there are likely to be important interactions between product market regulations and other 
forms of regulation such as in labour and credit markets.  
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There is a large amount of empirical research on trade liberalisation, and many studies show a 
positive relationship between openness and growth.
6 Harrison and Revenga (1995) note that in 
transition economies, where large impacts have been found, trade reforms went hand in hand 
with big restructuring programmes. This highlights the identification problem, which we discuss 
in greater detail below. There have also been a large number of studies reviewing the impact of 
the Single Market Programme which on the whole find a positive impact on productivity and 
growth.
7  
One recent and carefully done study is Pavcnik (2002) which looks at  trade liberalization in 
Chile, and finds that reallocation from low to high productivity producing plants through exit 
contributes around 2% to growth in manufacturing (traded sectors). Two other directly relevant 
papers are Olley and Pakes (1996), which finds that deregulation of the US telecommunications 
industry led to increases in productivity through restructuring that shifted capital from less to 
more productive firms and induced the exit of lower productivity firms, and Gagnepain and 
Uribe (2003) which shows that the 1992 European deregulation package introduced a significant 
change in the behaviour of airline carriers and led to efficiency improvements.  
3.2  Productive efficiency 
The impact of reforms to regulation or increasing product market competition on productive 
efficiency works through changing incentives to organize work more effectively, trim fat and 
reduce slack, as well as potential benefits that accrue from returns to scale as market size 
increases. 
                                                 
6 See, inter alia, Levinsohn (1993), Sleuwaegen and Yanawaky (1988), Jaquemin and Sapir (1991), Levinsohn 
(1993), Pavcnik (2002), Harrison and Revenga (1995), Redding and Proudman (1997). 
7 There are too many to cite here but see, inter alia, Buiges et al (1991) and Mayes and Hart (1994), Jaquemin and 
Sapir (1991), Bottasso and Sembenelli (1998).  
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The main impact of better regulation or higher product market competition on productive 
efficiency that has been emphasized in the theoretical literature has been the incentive effect on 
managers and workers to reduce slack, trim fat and structure the workplace more efficiently. This 
strand of the literature motivates Nickell (1996)’s influential empirical paper. The agency cost 
literature
8 suggests that inefficiencies arise because managers (or workers) slack, there is a 
conflict of interest between owners and managers, and the owners cannot perfectly monitor the 
managers’ effort. Product market competition can affect the incentives of managers to slack 
(positively or negatively) and the ability of the owner to monitor the manager (positively). 
Moving ownership from the public to private sector is one form of deregulation where this effect 
may be particularly important. The expected gains from privatization are based on the idea that 
privatization improves the incentives of owners to monitor managers,
9 for any given level of 
competition a change in ownership would be expected to lead to an increase in productive 
efficiency. Competition may or may not increase after privatization - this depends on the 
regulatory and institutional structures and whether they create sufficient market pressure. A lack 
of competition can thwart the incentives for productivity improvements in privatized industries. 
In industries where there are natural monopolies (largely high fixed cost or network industries) 
the impact of privatization depends on the market structure and regulatory regimes that ensues 
post-privatisation.
10  
Empirically it is difficult to distinguish between effects on productive and dynamic efficiency. 
Here we consider the impact on productive efficiency to be captured on the level of TFP – it 
represents a step change in the level of TFP, as firms reduce slack and cut fat – while dynamic 
efficiency is captured by a change in the growth rate of TFP.  
                                                 
8 See, inter alia, Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), Willig (1987), Vickers (1994), Holmstrom (1982),  Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983), Schmidt (1997), Martin (1993). 
9 For a recent ssurvey of the literature see Megginson and Netter (2001). 
10 See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for a survey.  
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Nickell (1996) finds an impact of changes in product market competition, as captured by firms’ 
market share, on productivity levels of UK firms. However, potential endogeneity in market 
share is not dealt with properly, so imputing a causal relationship between competition and TFP 
growth is problematic.
11 
Pavnick (2002), when considering trade liberalization in Chile, finds within plant productivity 
increases in manufacturing (traded) sectors of 3-10%. These are large increases. In contrast, 
Olley and Pakes (1996) did not find within firm growth in productivity as a result of the US 
telecoms deregulation. 
A large empirical literature exists on the economic impact of privatization and liberalization, 
particularly of network industries. Several points are of particular relevance for the present study. 
First, there is often a failure of competition to develop unaided – “liberalisation” and 
“privatisation” need not mean the same thing everywhere, and they need not have the same 
effect. This is well documented in the UK by Green and Haskel (2003). Take the case of British 
Gas. At privatisation, rival suppliers where given permission to enter the market. However, they 
would need to buy gas from North Sea operators whose main customer was British Gas and ship 
it through British Gas’ pipes, at charges set by British Gas. No entry occurred. It was not until 
the early 1990s after intervention by the UK competition authority, when British Gas negotiated 
specific targets for its market share and took steps to help rival suppliers that there was effective 
competition in the industry.  
Second, there is controversy in the literature as to whether it is the transfer of ownership or the 
restructuring associated with privatisation that is of consequence.
12 Haskel and Szymanski 
(1992) for instance find that privatisation itself was not strongly associated with rises in TFP in 
                                                 
11 Two empirical papers, Jagannathan and Srinivasan (2000) and Griffith (2001), find support for the idea that 
increased competition improves performance by affecting managers and workers incentives to slack. 
12  See the survey by Megginson and Netter (2001).  
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the UK, but that pre-privatisation restructuring was. Bishop and Kay (1988) and Bishop and 
Thompson (1992), again for the UK, reach the same conclusion on this point. 
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) try to infer the effects of deregulation on performance by using 
variation of market outcomes and regulatory regime over time and countries for the OECD. They 
focus on three measures of performance: labour productivity, prices and quality. The degree of 
market competition and the time to liberalisation emerge as their two main explanations for the 
cross-country and time variability in productivity and prices, while the influence of state 
ownership, time to privatisation and the internationalisation of domestic markets have less clear-
cut effects. 
Ros (1999) also examines the relative importance of deregulation/liberalisation and privatisation 
in promoting teledensity, operating efficiency, and the quality and pricing of telecom services in 
OECD countries, with privatisation notably playing a greater role in the Ros study. On balance 
empirical studies conclude that deregulation and liberalisation in Telecommunication are 
associated with significant growth in teledensity and operating efficiency, and significant 
improvements in price and quality. 
With trade liberalization there may be economies of scale gains if output increases (although it is 
not necessarily the case that output within the region will increase, e.g. if there are lower cost 
producers outside the region).  
3.3  Dynamic efficiency 
Gains through allocative and productive efficiency represent one-off changes to the level of 
productivity and output and accrue relatively quickly. Improvements in dynamic efficiency, 
through innovation and the introduction of new good and new processes, potentially have a much 
larger impact but are also likely to take much longer to accrue. In addition, it is not clear that 
increasing product market competition (reducing rents) leads to increases in firms’ incentives to 
innovation. This is because in more competitive markets the potential gains from innovation are  
  - 17 -
lower. Increases in market size, e.g. through trade liberalization, could have a positive impact on 
innovation if they increased the size of potential rents (although if it coincided with an increase 
in competition the net affect could be positive or negative). Trade liberalisation may also 
increase the opportunities for technology transfer if it results in new goods or services entering 
the market or the entry of firms with lower cost technologies. 
The early endogenous growth and industrial organisation literatures
13 suggested that increased 
product market competition led to reduced innovative activity, as more competition reduced the 
monopoly rents that reward successful innovators. Results in these models were driven by the 
assumption that innovation was made by outsiders (so pre-innovation rents were zero) so the 
payoff to innovation is just equal to the post innovation rent. Clearly under these assumptions 
there are larger incentives to innovate when rents are higher. Increasing product market 
competition reduces the post innovation rents so reduces incentives to innovate.  
These models generally exhibit increasing returns to scale driven by the fact that ideas are non-
rivalrous (once invented it is relatively costless to use an idea many times over). The size of the 
economy – as measured by population or the number of researchers – affects either the long run 
growth rate or the long run level of per capita income.
14 
More recent endogenous growth models,
15 extend the basic Schumpeterian model by allowing 
incumbent firms to innovate. In these models, innovation incentives depend not so much upon 
post-innovation rents per se, but more upon the difference between post-innovation and pre-
innovation rents (the latter were equal to zero in the basic model where all innovations were 
made by outsiders). In this case, more product market competition may end up fostering 
innovation and growth as it may reduce a firm's pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces its 
                                                 
13 See Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) Caballero-Jaffe (1993), Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980). 
14 Jones (1999) provides a review of these effects. 
15 Aghion-Harris-Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt, Vickers (2001), ABBGH (2002).  
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post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental profits from 
innovating, and thereby encourage R&D investments aimed at “escaping competition”. In these 
models product market competition will affect innovation to a larger extent in more “neck-and-
neck” industries, that is in industries in which oligopolistic firms face more similar production 
costs. The firm with lower unit costs is referred to as the technological leader, and the one with 
higher unit costs the follower, in the corresponding industry, and when both firms have the same 
unit costs they are referred to as neck-and-neck firms. 
In this framework firms innovate in order to reduce production costs, and they do it “step-by-
step”, in the sense that a laggard firm in any industry must first catch up with the technological 
leader before becoming itself a leader in the future. In neck-and-neck industries competition is 
particularly intense and it is also in those industries that the “escape-competition” effect pointed 
out above is strongest. On the other hand, in less neck-and-neck, or more “unleveled”, industries, 
more competition may also reduce innovation as the laggard’s reward to catching up with the 
technological leader may fall (this is a “Schumpeterian effect” of the kind emphasized in the 
earlier models). Finally, by increasing innovation incentives relatively more in neck-and-neck 
industries than in unleveled industries, an increase in product market competition will tend to 
reduce the fraction of neck-and-neck industries in the economy in equilibrium; this “composition 
effect” reinforces the Schumpeterian effect in inducing a negative correlation between product 
market competition and aggregate productivity growth or the aggregate rate of innovations.  
Recent work by Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2003) introduces entry into such a 
model. They show that the affect of increasing entry threat depends on the country, industry or 
firm’s distance to the frontier. In countries or industries that are close to the (world) 
technological frontier, fostering entry or competition will increase incumbents’ incentives to 
innovate in order to escape potential entrants or competitors. However, in countries and 
industries that lag far behind the frontier, higher entry or higher competition on their own tends 
to discourage incumbent firms from innovating. This model suggests that the overall impact of  
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trade liberalisation will depend on the current state of technology in the country or industry.
16 
However, in the long run trade liberalization will increase the overall average growth rate 
because in equilibrium there will be more industries where the affect is positive. Trade 
liberalization is also likely to increase inequality across regions and/or industries. EU (2003) 
emphasizes the fact that post-war growth in Europe was largely based on imitation, driven by 
capital accumulation, while what is needed now is for European countries to shift towards 
growth based on innovation. 
In terms of empirical evidence Nickell (1996) found a positive impact of competition on firm 
level TFP growth. Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) found that firms with higher market 
shares innovated more but that at the industry level there were more total innovations in more 
competitive industries. So in aggregate competition leads to more innovation, however, within 
industries it is the dominant firms that innovate most. 
Recent work has suggested that the relationship may be non-linear, with both very high and very 
low levels of product market competition providing lower incentives to innovation.
17  This lends 
empirical support to the model in which incumbent firms can innovate (as well as entrants) so 
that innovation incentives depend on the difference between post-innovation and pre-innovation 
rents.
18 
3.4  Overall growth impact 
To summarise: 
  allocative efficiency is improved by reducing the level of monopoly rents and bringing 
prices more in line with marginal costs; in addition output may be shifted towards more 
                                                 
16 This is based on the model in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002).  
17 Aghion et al (2002). 
18 See, for example, Aghion et al (2002), Griffith (2001), Griffith et al (2000,2001).  
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efficient firms. Reforms such as trade liberalization expose domestic firm to foreign 
competition, reducing their market power and there may be economies of scale gains if 
output increases (although this is not necessarily the case). However, there may be 
distributional consequences, some countries, industries or individuals could lose out, e.g. 
where a country or industry is far from the technological frontier. The resulting 
adjustment process, as plants shut down and workers are displaced, may be lengthy. 
Productivity levels in some countries could fall (if their comparative advantage is in 
lower productivity sectors), although from a world-wide perspective this results in an 
increase in allocative efficiency. 
  productive efficiency may be improved through economies of scale or scope, or through 
changing incentives for managers and workers to slack (although this latter affect can, in 
theory, go in the opposite direction); part of the growth affect of product market 
liberalization comes through the increasing returns affect implied by the endogenous 
growth models and the assumption that ideas are non-rivalrous (can be used repeated at 
low incremental cost); trade liberalization and the opening up of markets may also 
change opportunities for technology transfer and affect the rate of adoption of new 
technologies; 
  the impact on dynamic efficiency is perhaps the hardest to pin down, product market 
reforms will affect incentive to engage in innovative activity, but it is not clear in what 
direction and the impact is likely to differ across countries and industries depending on a 
number of factors including the current state of technology and other regulatory 
institutions; 
  empirical studies often can not separately identify the impact of product market 
regulations and reforms on allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. In terms of the 
overall growth impact: 
  there may be a substantial and lengthy adjustment period, and there are likely to be 
winners and losers in the adjustment process;  
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  empirical studies have for the most part pointed to a positive impact of lower product 
market regulation or higher product market competition on productivity and growth, 
however, a number of empirical issues remain unresolved; recent empirical work has 
found an inverted U relationship with both very high and very low level of competition 
being bad for innovation. 
Many studies have not been able to identify a causal relationship. They have shown a simply a 
correlation or association. This difficulty in identifying a causal relationship is common across 
studies in this area (and many other fields of economics). In addition, there are many difficulties 
in measuring the key variables of interest – the extent of product market reforms, the extent of 
competition and market size, macroeconomic performance – and the validity of any study rest on 
careful attention to these measurement issues, which are discussed in greater detail below. 
Three empirical papers merit more extended discussion of their direct relevance. These are 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Card and Freeman (2003) and Alesina et al (2003). 
3.5  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) (henceforth N&S) relate a large number of reforms to growth in 
total (multi) factor productivity in one of the most comprehensive empirical studies in this field. 
In their paper the impact of product market reforms affects the rate of TFP convergence across 
countries and industries. Those countries and industries experiencing the greatest reform 
experience temporarily faster growth rates while they catch up to the international steady-state 
growth rate. The specific question they address is whether the different patterns of reform across 
countries can help explain the differences in growth rates across countries and industries. They 
highlight two main affects of reform: lowering entry barriers and state control are associated with 
faster catch-up to the frontier in manufacturing industries, with industries furthest behind the 
frontier getting greatest rewards; the process of privatization is associated with productivity 
gains.  
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It is worth examining their empirical methods and results in some detail because they highlight 
many of the difficulties involved in using cross-country data on regulations to examine the 
effects of product market reforms. The general approach follows Griffith, Redding and Van 
Reenen (2000, 2002), who explicitly derive a model of productivity growth and catch-up from an 
endogenous growth framework. N&S replace the role of R&D in this approach with their 
measures of product market regulation. Thus product market regulation affects an industry’s TFP 
growth both directly and when interacted with the industry’s distance to the world technological 
frontier, or “technology gap”. The general model is thus as follows 
) * ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ( ln techgap PMR PMR techgap Leader TFP TFP δ γ β α + + + ∆ = ∆  
where PMR is an index of various indicators of product market regulation, and the coefficients 
are usually allowed to vary between manufacturing and service industries. Many of N&S’s 
results stem from the interaction between PMR and the technology gap, which the authors 
interpret as indicating that stricter product market regulation delays the process of technology 
adoption in countries that lag behind the frontier. However, the assumption that product market 
regulations act in the same way as R&D expenditures do in the original Griffith et al model is 
rather ad hoc. In the case of R&D there is clear theoretical and empirical support for the idea that 
in order to imitate you need to be doing some R&D yourself. It is not so clear that the primary 
impact of product market reforms and regulations should be on the rate of technology transfer. 
N&S use a panel of 17 manufacturing and 6 business services industries in 18 OECD countries 
over the period 1984-1998. The baseline specification (Table 5 in their paper), which does not 
include any measures of product market reforms, finds a positive direct effect of the leader’s TFP 
growth only in service industries (coefficient α  in the above equation) and a stronger effect of 
the technology gap in service industries than manufacturing (coefficient β ). The coefficients 
have the expected sign, and the greater evidence of catch-up in service industries accords with 
results in Bernard and Jones (1996) who suggest that service industries may be more 
homogeneous across countries than manufacturing industries.  
  - 23 -
The first set of product market regulation regressions include a country-level, non-time-varying 
summary measure of regulation (combining state control and barriers to entry), as well as a 
country-level, time-varying measure of overall privatization (their Table 6). Several issues arise 
with the use of these PMR indicators. First, the fact that the regulation indicators do not vary 
across industries or over time means that country fixed effect, which would control for 
unobservable country characteristics on growth, cannot be included in the regressions. 
Identification of the coefficients therefore comes from cross-section variation across countries in 
the average growth rate of TFP. No significant results are found until the regulation indicators 
are interacted with the technology gap measure. Given that the regulation measures are not 
significant on their own, it would be possible to re-introduce country dummies to check that the 
interaction result is robust to unobservable persistent differences across countries. However, this 
is not done. 
Secondly, the regulation measures used in N&S capture the situation in 1998, which is at the end 
of the sample. The underlying assumption is that end-of-period values are representative of the 
cross-country patterns of regulation over the entire 1984-1998 period. This will not be true if 
some countries have liberalized their markets faster than others. This makes causal 
interpretations of the results extremely problematic. 
Finally, the information on product market regulations has been aggregated into a single 
summary measure. This imposes strong and possibly arbitrary restrictions on the way in which 
individual regulations can affect productivity growth. It also mean that it is not possible to 
deduce from the results which specific regulations have the largest effects, and how 
economically important those effects are. To some extent this may be inherently difficult due to 
high levels of correlation between different regulations, but a more flexible approach using 
greater numbers of individual indicators could be both more robust and more informative. This 
criticism applies to almost all of the regulatory indicators used by N&S. 
In contrast to the country measure of regulation, the time-varying measure of overall 
privatization appears to have a consistently positive effect on TFP growth, although these are not  
  - 24 -
interacted with the technology gap. However, the privatization effect is no longer significant in a 
specification that includes a time-varying measure of regulation. This time varying measure is 
constructed by interacting the non-time-varying measures described above with a time-varying 
indicator of regulatory reforms in seven service sector network industries. The underlying 
assumption is that developments in these network industries are representative of regulatory 
changes in the economy as a whole. This is very unlikely to hold due to the special nature of the 
network industries considered, and the significant result should be interpreted extremely 
cautiously. The fact that the indicator of overall privatization is no longer significant suggests a 
positive correlation between privatization and regulatory reform over time within countries. As 
mentioned above, this problem is likely to be true of many indicators of product market reform 
and again this makes causal interpretations of the results difficult. 
The second set of results use time-varying measures of entry liberalization in manufacturing and 
services, where the former is constructed using data on trade liberalization, and the latter using 
regulatory reforms in network industries. None of the results are significant, except for a positive 
effect of entry liberalization in services on TFP growth in manufacturing. The authors suggest 
that this may reflect changes in the scope for efficiency enhancements related to the use of 
service inputs, but the result is difficult to interpret with confidence. Another possibility is that it 
reflects cheaper or higher quality service inputs. A time-varying indicator of privatization that 
varies between services and manufacturing also has a significantly positive effect on TFP growth 
in all of these regressions. 
The final set of results uses non-time-varying industry-specific measures of barriers to entry, as 
well as the time-varying measures of entry-liberalization used previously. The coefficients on the 
measures of barriers to entry are either insignificant or suggest a slightly positive effect of 
barriers to entry on TFP growth. The only exception is when barriers to entry in manufacturing 
are interacted with the technology gap, suggesting that increased barriers to entry may reduce the 
positive ‘catch up’ effect. Entry liberalization in services again appears to have a significantly 
positive effect on TFP growth in the whole economy, as does overall privatization.  
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Overall, results that appear relatively robust are the positive effect of overall privatization and 
entry liberalization in services on economy-wide TFP growth. The latter of these is problematic 
due to the summary nature of the measure of entry liberalization as discussed above.
19 The 
interactions of PMR measures with the technology gap suggest that the negative effects of higher 
product market regulations on TFP growth may be greater in countries that lie furthest behind the 
technological frontier. This appears to contrast with the theoretical and empirical work by 
Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2003). ABRZ study the impact of trade reform in India 
over the 1990s. They find that the impact of liberalization varies across sates, and in particular 
depends on the state of technology and labour market institutions before reform. States that were 
near the technological frontier and had liberalized labour markets experienced increased growth 
in response to trade liberalization (though increasing competition). Industries that were either far 
behind the frontier and/or had rigid labour market institutions suffered from increased trade 
liberalization. ABRZ interpret these results as reflected increased rates of technology transfer 
from frontier countries to India. An alternative interpretation might be that the measures of 
regulation underestimate the true extent of product market regulation in countries furthest from 
the frontier. 
A further difficulty in the interpretation of Nicoletti and Scarpetta’s results is that they do not 
relate product market reforms to actual measures of product market competition, and the 
channels by which product market reforms may affect productivity growth are not made clear. 
Thus they do not show that the product market reforms considered led to an increase in product 
market competition or entry, or how these factors are related to TFP growth at the industry level.  
                                                 
19 In an appendix not published in the final Economic Policy version of the paper they appeared to show that these 
results were not robust to the inclusion of outlying observations.  
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3.6  Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003) 
A recent OECD working paper by Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli investigates the 
relationship between product market regulation and investment in OECD countries over the 
1975-1998 period. The paper provides a theoretical framework and then uses the same OECD 
time-varying regulation indices as Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) to investigate the empirical 
relationship between regulation and investment. This paper provides a strong link between 
theory and the empirical investigation. 
The theoretical framework is similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), except that labour 
markets are assumed to be competitive, in order to abstract from labour market regulation, a 
second factor (capital) is added to the model, and the capital stock is endogenised in order to 
generate predictions about investment.
20 The product market is characterized by monopolistic 
competition, where the elasticity of demand is assumed to depend negatively on the degree of 
product market regulation. One possible interpretation is that the elasticity of demand is an 
increasing function of the number of firms, which is in turn determined by the cost of entry. Thus 
less restrictive entry regulations increase the number of firms, which increases the elasticity of 
demand and thus lowers the level of rents in the economy. 
In this context, firms choose capital and labour to maximize the present discounted value of 
future cash flow, subject to standard quadratic adjustment costs associated with investment. The 
authors assume that these adjustment costs can also be affected by product market regulation. 
For reasonable parameter values, the solution to the model generates predictions about the 
relationship between product market regulation, the mark-up (or the level of rents) and the level 
of investment and employment. Deregulation, by reducing the mark-up, leads to an increase in 
investment and a higher demand for labour. This kind of theoretical framework lies behind the 
analytical approach used in our study. 
                                                 
20 Blanchard and Giavazzi only have one factor – labour.  
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The empirical section of the paper looks at the effect on investment of time varying summary 
indexes of barriers to entry and public ownership provided by the OECD in three network 
industries (Electricity, Gas and Water, ISIC 40-41; Communications and Post, ISIC 64; and 
Transport and Storage, ISIC 60-63). The empirical specification takes the form of a dynamic 
model of investment with country, industry and year effects. The authors find that barriers to 
entry have a significant negative effect on investment, but that public ownership has no 
significant effect. They suggest that public ownership may provide firms with incentives to over-
invest that cancel out any negative effect. The scale of the effect they find is large: the reduction 
in the regulation index in the UK communications sector over the 1984-1994 period generates a 
predicted increase in the investment rate of 3.27 percentage points. The actual increase was 3.03 
percentage points (from 4.96% to 7.99%). 
3.7  Card and Freeman (2003) 
Another recent study that is directly relevant is the forthcoming book by Blundell, Card and 
Freeman and the introductory chapter by Card and Freeman (2003). This book provides an in 
depth analysis of two decades of reforms to product and factor markets in the UK. Each chapter 
considers micro evidence for the impact of different types of reform. Card and Freeman 
conclude,  
“The evidence shows that the UK made greater market reforms than most other 
advanced countries and that it arrested the nearly century-long trend in relative 
economic decline of the UK relative to its historic competitors, Germany and France… It 
is difficult to link the reforms to the improved economic performance relative to these 
other countries, but at the minimum our analysis has shown the change in the UK 
economy cannot be readily explained by standard macroeconomic change in labor or 
capital. … Absent a unequivocal counterfactual of what would have happened had the 
UK not proceeded with reforms, we cannot definitively judge the market reforms, though  
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weighing the diverse evidence, they do seem to have played a positive role in aggregate 
economic growth.” 
Thus, Card and Freeman are saying that there remains a substantial unexplained component of 
growth (or lack of decline) in the UK, and that this seems to be associated with a number of 
reforms to product and labour markets. However, even the large number of studies that were 
undertaken in the individual chapters of their book were not able to conclusively link these 
reforms to performance, in large part because they were not able to form a clear picture of what 
would have happened in the absence of these reforms. This ability to identify the counterfactual 
is essential in any evaluation, without this it is not possible to impute causality to any observed 
association between reforms and growth. This is the major difficulty with Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta’s paper and in our empirical work reported below. 
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4  Modelling strategy 
We are interested in estimating the effects of reforms to product market regulations on 
macroeconomic outcomes. The literature in this area suggests that the main way in which 
regulations and reforms are channeled into macro outcomes is through affecting the level of 
economic rents available in the market. This in turn affects price levels, the allocation of inputs 
and outputs and incentives to engage in efficiency enhancing activity and innovation. We capture 
the level of rents available using an estimate of the markup or price-cost margin.  
We examine the relationship between a large number of reforms and a measures of rents in the 
aggregate economy, as well as in manufacturing and service sectors separately. This is an 
important step and one that much of the existing empirical literature omits. The impact of 
different product market reforms on product market competition and rents may vary 
significantly, and a priori restrictions imposed by combining reforms into a single index can 
provide misleading results. In addition, this analysis highlights the important identification 
problem faced by all empirical work in this area  (but which not all papers discuss). In order to 
obtain econometric estimates that identify the key parameters of interest separately from other 
cross country differences we need to have indicators of product market regulations and reforms 
that vary differentially over time across countries or industries. These do not always exist – 
either due to data availability, or because many regulations are similar across countries and many 
reforms happened around the same time. We adopt a strategy to identify the parameters of 
interest that is valid under certain assumptions (which are spelled out).  
Macro-economic performance is measured by growth in output. This can be decomposed into 
total factor productivity (TFP), factor accumulation and changes in the quality of factors. We 
estimate the impact of product market reforms on these performance indicators both through 
rents and directly. This can be described as a two-stage estimation procedure, or as an 
instrumental variables approach. We estimate the effects of product market reforms on the level 
of rents, and then estimate the effect of the mark-up on macroeconomic outcomes using 
measures of product market reforms as instruments for the mark-up. The ultimate effects of  
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product market regulations and reforms on macroeconomic outcomes, as mediated via the level 
of rents, can be evaluated by combining the estimated coefficients from the first and second 
stages. 
Using an instrumental variables estimator is important because it controls for potential 
endogeneity in the mark up. For example, a positive demand shock would lead both to increases 
in output and in the level of profitability. These variables would then appear to be correlated, but 
this would not be because of any causal relationship between them. Using instruments that affect 
the markup but that do not directly affect performance allows us to identify a causal relationship. 
However, this relies on the assumption that reforms only affect performance through affecting 
the level of markup. We use regulatory reforms which affect the level of markups, but which we 
assume do not affect macro performance directly, as instruments. We test the validity of these 
assumptions using a test of over-identifying restrictions, which we describe in more details 
below. In addition, we are explicitly interested in the estimated coefficients in the first stage as 
these tell us how product market reforms have affected the level of economic rents available.  
This approach is an alternative to aggregating various indicators into a summary measure of 
product market regulation using a priori restrictions as in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). The key 
advantages of our approach are first that the nature of the aggregation is determined by the data, 
rather than being imposed a priori, and secondly that we can recover the expected effects of 
specific regulations from the estimated coefficients in the first stage. 
We consider equilibrium output at the country or industry level: 
(1)   () it it it it it A R L K f Y , , , =         
where K is index of tangible capital inputs, L is index of labour inputs, R is index of intangible 
capital inputs and A is a measure of TFP.   
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Product market competition is captured by µ, the markup of price over marginal cost, and 























In the short run we consider the number of firms, tangible and intangible capital as being fixed. 
Labour inputs adjust through hiring, firing, redundancies and changes to working hours. The 
extent and speed of adjustment will depend on labour market regulations and the nature of 
bargaining between employers and workers. In the short term TFP adjusts through reductions in 
slack. In the longer run firms can enter and exit, tangible and intangible capital investment can 
occur and TFP can adjust through investment in new technologies, changes in workplace 
organization, and technological spillovers.  
We use only those regulations and reforms which vary differentially over time across countries 
(or across industries). This is because we believe that it is important to control for differences 
across countries that we are not able to observe, but which are constant over time and may be 
correlated with product market reforms and performance. We control for these unobservable 
characteristics by including country specific effects, which are highly statistically significant in 
all our regressions. Indicators that only vary across countries, but not over time, cannot be 
included (because they would be exactly collinear with the country fixed effects) but are 
controlled for by the country specific effects. The estimates obtained using this “within” 
estimator, which identifies the impact off of differential time series variation, are preferable to 
“between” estimates which identify the impact from cross-sectional differences which may be 
affected by measurement errors and other unobservable differences. 
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We begin by estimating the first stage, or reduced form, regressions of the mark-up on the 
indicators of product market reforms 
(3)  
µ
γ µ ε β β µ it t i it it it t f YGAP PMR + + + + =  
where  it PMR  represents a vector of time and country/industry varying indicators of product 
market regulation,  it YGAP  is a measure of the output gap that captures country-specific cyclical 
factors,  f  is a country fixed effect and  t  represents year dummies (these capture common macro 
shocks). 
The estimated first stage coefficients  µ β ˆ  are of interest in themselves and tell us about how 
specific regulations or reforms have affected the degree of product market competition, as 
measured by the mark up. In addition, the explanatory power of the regressors in the reduced 
form regressions is an indicator of whether they are good instruments for the mark-up in the 
second-stage regressions. To illustrate this we present the R
2 statistics for the reduced form 
regressions. 
We then estimate the effects of the predicted level of rents from the first stage on factor 
demands, labour productivity and TFP.
21 For factor demands we are interested in the impact of 
product market competition on the levels: 
(4)  
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Where  ) ˆ ( it f µ  is some function of  it µ ˆ  , for example a linear function such as  it µ β β ˆ 1 0 + . For 
labour productivity and TFP we are interested in both the level and growth rate, for example: 
                                                 
21 In practice we actually do this in one step, using the regressors from the reduced form as instruments for the mark-
up to ensure that the standard errors are correct.  
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(5)    
TFP
it t i it it TFP it t f YGAP f TFP ε β µ γ + + + + = ) ˆ ( ln  
. ) ˆ ( ln
TFP
it t i it it TFP it t f YGAP f TFP
∆
∆ + + + + = ∆ ε β µ γ  
Recent papers in the endogenous growth literature have suggested that the relationship between 
product market competition and productivity growth may be non-linear, with both very high and 
very low levels of competition being bad for growth.
22 We investigate the possibility that the 
function  ) ˆ ( it f µ  may be non-linear by including both a linear and a squared term in the mark-
up. 
In the two stage or instrumental variables framework described above the ultimate effect of 
individual reforms on macroeconomic outcomes can be calculated by multiplying the estimated 
first and second stage coefficients. If the relationship in the second stage is non-linear then the 
effects of product market reforms will depend on the initial level of product market competition 
as measured by the mark-up. 
The key assumption we are making is that the impact of product market reforms on macro 
economic performance only acts through the level of economic rents available in the economy, 
and that these reforms to do not affect performance in any other way. We test this assumption 
using a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. If we consider the factor demand equations 
numbered (4) above, the vector of indicators of product market reforms,  it PMR , is excluded 
from the regression, and acts only as a group of instruments for the mark-up. If the assumption 
that all the elements of  it PMR  should be excluded from the regression is not valid then the 
estimated coefficient on the mark-up may be biased. Because there are more elements of the 
                                                 
22 See Aghion et al (2002).  
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vector  it PMR  than variables being instrumented, the equation is said to be over-identified. It is 
possible to test the over-identifying exclusion restrictions using a Sargan test.
23 
If the Sargan test rejects the over-identifying restrictions, this does not provide any guidance on 
which elements of  it PMR  should be included in the regression. In order to investigate this we use 
a procedure that is equivalent to a Lagrange Multiplier test of over-identifying restrictions.
24 This 
involves estimating an equation of type (4), taking the estimated residuals and regressing these 




it t i it it L it t f YGAP f L ε β µ γ + + + + = ) ˆ ( ln  
which gives us the estimated residuals 
L
it ε ˆ . We then estimate the residuals regression by OLS: 
(7)  
L
it t i it it L
L
it u t f YGAP PMR + + + + = γ δ δ ε ˆ  
If any of the estimated   L δ ˆ  coefficients on the product market reform indicators in this equation 
are statistically different from zero this suggests that the relevant indicator should not have been 
excluded from the employment regression (6). The intuition behind this is as follows: if the 
indicator is correlated with the remaining unexplained variation in employment from the main 
regression then it contains relevant information about changes in employment that are not 
mediated through the mark-up, and it should have been included directly in the employment 
regression in the first place. When this happens we re-estimate equation (6) with the relevant 
indicator included directly. We repeat the exercise until the Sargan test does not reject the 
remaining over-identifying restrictions. 
                                                 
23 See Sargan (1958, 1988) Anderson and Rubin (1949), Hansen (1982) Arellano and Bond (1991). 
24 The Lagrange Multiplier test is asymptotically equivalent to the Sargan test in large samples.  
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The econometric approach described above allows us to identify the impact of product market 
reforms on a range of performance measures. However, it relies on several functional form 
assumptions in both the theory and in the econometric application. Including all of the PMR 
indicators directly in explaining macroeconomic performance is equivalent to difference-in-
difference methods from the evaluation (natural experiment) literature. We do this to consider 
the robustness of our results. This method highlights the fact that what we are doing is 
comparing an affect (or “treated”) group of countries with an unaffected (or “control”) group, 
and that it may be hard to identify an unaffected group, especially for large scale reforms which 
are likely to affect most industries and countries. This is the same identification problem as was 
highlighted above – and is dealt with inadequately in much of the literature. As emphasized by 
Card and Freeman (2002) it is hard to tell what the counterfactual growth rate would have been. 
Thus it is not clear that those countries/industries that did not undergo reforms provide a good 
representation of what would have happened in those countries that did, if they had not 
undergone the reforms. The other drawback, as discussed above, of this approach is that it does 
not allow us to say anything about the magnitude of the impact of future reforms or alternative 
reforms (unless we make further functional form assumptions). It may also be difficult to specify 
the timing of reforms across countries and industries and this may make evaluation difficult.  
4.1  Measuring the markup 
Our main intermediate indicator of interest is the mark-up. This most closely corresponds to the 
parameter specified in theoretical models which is the level of rents available to firms. We use 
this to capture the impact that changes in regulatory regimes over time have on product market 
competition. Other measures of product market competition such as a concentration index or a 
Herfindahl index have a number of well-documented problems associated with them. First, in 
order to measure them we need to have firm level data and we need to be able to define and 
measure the extent of the relevant markets (in terms of both which products are in the market and 
which geographic areas are covered by the same market). This is a problem that plagues policy 
makers and academics alike. Secondly, even if we are able to define markets, these indices are  
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not necessarily good indicators of the level of competition. Industries with high concentration or 
Herfindahl values can still be fiercely competitive, if for instance, the threat of entry is high.  
The mark-up, which is an approximation of the Lerner Index, can be shown to be a more robust 
measure of competition.
25 We construct a mark-up over value added (profitability measure) as 
follows: 





where all variables are in nominal prices. This simple measure of the mark-up can be shown to 
be equivalent to that proposed by Roeger (1995),
26 and contains an implicit assumption of 
constant returns to scale, such that marginal cost is equal to average cost. Capital costs are 
calculated using an assumed constant rental cost of capital. The calculated markup for the entire 
business enterprise sector is shown in Figure 2. It averages 1.26 and increases slightly over the 
period 1985 to 2000. This measure is clearly cyclical and there is big variation both within and 
between countries. The highest levels are in Italy, which has a mean of over 1.4 and reaches 
nearly to 1.5 by the end of the sample period. The lowest mean markups are in Germany and 
Austria. Finland experiences a rapid decline in the markup over the late 1980s followed by rapid 
increase after 1990.
27  
                                                 
25 See, inter alia, Boone (2000) and Aghion et al (2002). 
26 See Klette (1998) for a discussion. 
27 Overall, our measure are similar to other examples in the literature, for example those calculated for 
manufacturing industries by Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996).  
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Figure 2: Mark-up over Value-added.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data, the assumed rental cost of capital is 10%. 
 
This measure of the mark-up is biased downwards (upwards) in the presence of increasing 
(decreasing) returns to scale. It is possible to use estimates of average returns to scale at the 
industry level, combined with industrial structure at the country or sector level, to control for this 
bias.
28 However, it has not been possible for us to either estimate or find time-varying data on 
average returns to scale at the industry level. Since industrial structure does not change very 
quickly over time any bias that might arise due to different levels of increasing returns to scale 
across countries will be captured by the fixed country effects in our econometric analysis. 
Similarly, any trends that are common across countries will be captured by year effects. 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Antweiler and Trefler (2002). 
  








































1985 1990 199 5 20001985 1990 1995 20001985 1990 1995 20001985 1990 199 5 2000
AUS 1 BEL 2 DEN 3 FIN 4
FRA 5 DEU 6 ITA 9 NLD 10








































Figure 3: Mark-up with country and year means taken out.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data, the assumed rental cost of capital is 10%. 
 
Figure 3 plots the markups after the country mean and common time variation has been taken 
out.
29 This emphasizes the within country time-series variation, which is what we are relating to 
product market regulation in our econometric analysis below. There are a group of countries 
which experienced declining markups from 1990 onwards which include Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK (from 1995). In contrast, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy and Sweden experienced increasing markups over the 1990s. Finland is clearly 
                                                 
29 In a test for non-stationarity of the mark-up we reject the unit-root hypothesis at the 5% level. The autoregressive 
coefficient is equal to 0.897 with a robust standard error of 0.041.  
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very different to the other countries, part of which may be due to developments within the 
telecommunications industry which played a dominant role during the 1990s. 
We use the mark-up over value added rather than over output because data is available more 
often. In Figure 4 we show both. The mark-up over value added is higher than that over output, 
with the average for the aggregate mark-up over value added in our preferred sample of countries 
equal to 1.25, and the equivalent average for the mark-up over output equal to 1.11. The linear 
correlation between the two in the same sample is equal to 0.98, and all our main results are 
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Figure 4: Mark-up using output compared to using value-added.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data, the assumed rental cost of capital is 10%. 
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This measure of the markup, or profitability, is affected not only by the degree of competition in 
the market but also by the level of costs
30 and the volume of sales. Using the predicted mark-up 
as described in the methodology section should control for influences on the mark-up that are not 
related to developments in the product market. However, to check the robustness of our results 
we will also correlate our measures of product market regulations and reforms directly with the 
macro economic performance indicators as described above.  
In the appendix we look at the relation between regulations and price levels in the only industry 
where suitable data is available – the electricity industry. We were not able to obtain any suitable 
data over the relevant time period on price levels for other goods.
31 Comparing price levels 
across countries and markets can be problematic for a number of reasons (for example the 
characteristics of seemingly similar products can differ markedly across markets,
32 and non-
linear pricing schedules can mask differences) the electricity industry is one where the service 
provided is fairly homogeneous.  
We have also looked at the entry data in the OECD entry database. This contains information on  
the number of exiting, entering and continuing firms by year (usually at the two-digit industry 
level) for the period 1986-1997 for a subset of EU countries (and in some countries only for 
manufacturing industries). Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain useful results from this 
data, largely because the available sample sizes were too small once we restricted analysis to the 
years and countries for which we had data on relevant product market regulations. We would 
recommend that future work in this area begin by looking at the relationship between product 
                                                 
30  See Demsetz (1982) and Boone (2000). 
31 Our price data comes from the Eurostat structural indicators. Data is also available for the Post and 
Telecommunications industry but only for the 1997-2002 period. 
32 See, for example, work by Goldberg and Verboven on EU car markets.  
  - 41 -
market regulation and entry at the micro level in individual countries, before extending it to a 
cross-country investigation.  
4.2  Macroeconomic performance 
We measure macroeconomic performance using conventional indicators. These include the level 
and growth rate of labour productivity and total factor productivity, capital formation, R&D 
expenditure, numbers employed, and average hours worked. 
Information on output, value-added, capital expenditure and numbers employed come from the 
OECD STAN database. R&D expenditures are taken from the OECD ANBERD database. Hours 
worked comes from a dataset constructed by researchers at the university of Groningen.
33 Data 
on the key variables of interest for the period 1985-2000 are available for all EU countries except 
Greece, Republic of Ireland and Luxembourg. These countries are omitted from this analysis. In 
addition, Spain and Portugal are excluded from some parts of the analysis due to data 
availability. We include only current members of the EU in our empirical analysis, and thus 
exclude other OECD countries such as the USA and Japan. Appendix B gives further details on 
the data. 
Figure 1 shows business enterprise value-added per capita from 1980 to 2000. The US has a 
higher level and grows at a faster rate than European countries. All countries have higher per 
capita value added by the end of the period than at the beginning, although the growth rates vary. 
Finland experienced a substantial dip over the early 1990s followed by a rapid recovery. Portugal 
and Spain have had persistently lower levels of per capita value added compared to the other 
countries. There has been relatively little change in the ranking of countries within this group, 
although Card and Freeman (2003) show that over a longer time period (back to 1960) there has 
                                                 
33 "University of Groningen and The Conference Board, GGDC Total Economy 
Database, July 2003, http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc" 
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been more change in the ranking of countries with, for example, the UK falling from 3
rd to 12
th 
amongst OECD countries. 
Figure 5 plots value added per worker (a measure of labour productivity) from 1980 to 2000.
34 
Portugal remains at the bottom of the chart, while Spain moves from the bottom in terms of 
value-added per capita to around the median in terms of value-added per worker. The US and 
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Figure 5: Value-added per worker. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. Value-added is in 1995 US 
dollars using deflators and PPP exchange rates. 
The difference between per worker and per capita value added reflects the unemployment rate, 
the proportion of the population of working age and participation rates. Figure 6 shows the 
                                                 
34 The number of workers is defined as numbers engaged. Where this is not available we use numbers employed.  
  - 43 -
unemployment rate from 1980 to 2000. We can see, for example, that Spain has very high 
unemployment, so this will in part explain the difference in value added per capita and per 
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Figure 6: Unemployment rate. Source: OECD. 
We use a measure of the output gap to control for country specific business cycles. The measure 
we use is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook. Figure 7 shows the output gap for the 
countries in our sample over the 1980-2000 period, measured as the percentage deviation of 
current output from potential output.  
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Figure 8: labour share. Source: Authors’ calculation using OECD data. 
Figure 8 shows the labour share, calculated as the wage bill over value-added.
35 This declines 
over the period for all countries. The average level of just under 0.6 is low compared to what we 
normally see with firm level datasets. Italy’s labour share below 0.5 seems unrealistically low. 
For this, as well as other reasons, it is important to allow for country specific effecting the 
econometric analysis below. If errors of measurement are fairly constant over time within 
countries then the use of country fixed effects or growth rates in regressions will partially control 
for them. 
 
Figure 9 shows an index of numbers employed/engaged (normalized to 1 in 1980 so the growth 
rate is comparable across countries). We see that countries have had very different experiences. 
Finland and Sweden have experienced big reductions in employment while the Netherlands and 
the US experienced strong employment growth. Figure 10 shows an index of gross fixed capital 
formation (again normalized to 1 in 1980). The US and Spain experience rapid growth in capital 
formation, while Finland lagged behind, particularly over the 1990s. 
                                                 
35 The labour share has been smoothed by taking the predicted values from a regression of the labour share on 
country dummies and the capital/labour ratio, following a procedure used by Harrigan (1998?).  
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Figure 9: Numbers employed (rebased to 1980=1). Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data  
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Figure 10: Gross fixed capital formation (rebased to 1980=1). Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
 
Figure 11 shows an index of R&D expenditure (normalized to 1 in 1991, the first year data is 
available for all countries). Finland’s exceptionally fast growth is heavily influenced by Nokia.  
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Figure 11: Real R&D expenditure (re-based to 1991=1). Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
We calculate the level of TFP using a superlative index following Caves et al (1982). This is 
consistent with a translog production function. Growth in TFP is also measured with a 
superlative index. Capital stock is constructed from gross fixed capital formation using a 
perpetual inventory method. The precise method was calibrated so that the calculated capital 
stock was similar to the OECD capital stock contained in the STAN data where the latter was 
available. Using our calculated capital stock, rather than OECD calculated capital stock, greatly 
extends the coverage of the sample but may raise some concerns about measurement error. 
Figure 12 shows an index of the relative level of TFP. The level is highest in the US, with 
Belgium, France and the UK highest in Europe. Again, Finland lags behind, though catches up 
over the 1990s.  
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Figure 12: Relative total factor productivity. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
It is well known that conventional measures of TFP are biased when product markets are not 
perfectly competitive (see Appendix).
36 This means that estimates of the impact of product 
market reform on TFP could give spurious or misleading results. This is especially true when 
regressing TFP on the mark up. This is potentially less of problem with growth rates where 
biases that are constant over time will be differenced out.  
Table 1 shows the average growth rate in labour productivity over the 1980s and 1990s, while 
Table 2 shows the average growth rate in total factor productivity. 
                                                 
36 See, inter alia, Hall (1988, 1990), Roeger (1995),  Klette and Griliches (1996), Klette (1999).  
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Table 1: Growth in labour productivity 
Country 1985-1989  1990-2000  1985-2000 
Australia  0.024 0.022 0.023 
Belgium  0.016 0.016 0.016 
Denmark  0.011 0.017 0.015 
Finland  0.034 0.030 0.031 
France  0.024 0.011 0.015 
Germany .  0.017  0.017 
Italy  0.023 0.012 0.016 
Netherlands  0.009 0.008 0.008 
Portugal  0.030 0.023 0.024 
Spain  0.020 0.008 0.012 
Sweden  0.015 0.026 0.022 
UK  0.019 0.021 0.020 
Average  0.020 0.018 0.018 
Note: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. Labour productivity is measured as real value-added is in 1995 US 
dollars using deflators and PPP exchange rates.  
 
Table 2: Growth in total factor productivity 
Country 1985-1989  1990-2000  1985-2000 
Australia  0.017 0.012 0.014 
Belgium  0.013 0.007 0.009 
Denmark  0.004 0.011 0.008 
Finland  0.021 0.024 0.023 
France  0.014 0.004 0.007 
Germany .  0.008  0.008 
Italy  0.015 0.004 0.007 
Netherlands  0.005 0.004 0.004 
Portugal  0.044 0.008 0.012 
Spain 0.012  -0.003  0.001 
Sweden  0.005 0.018 0.013 
UK  0.013 0.012 0.012 
Average  0.012 0.009 0.010 
Note: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. Growth in total factor productivity is measured using a superlative 




  - 51 -
5  Aggregate economy 
We now turn to a consideration of product market regulations and reforms at the level of the 
aggregate economy. We first describe the available data on product market reforms, and justify 
the choice of indicators that we use in our econometric analysis. We then present results for the 
aggregate economy and for the manufacturing and services sectors. 
5.1  Product market reforms 
While a large number of papers and policy documents refer to the extensive reforms that have 
occurred to product markets over the past two decades there is relatively little direct information 
available on the scale and scope of these reforms across countries. The major reforms to affect 
European countries include the range of measures implemented as part of the Single Market 
Programme, deregulation and regulatory reform of network industries, reductions in state aids, 
reforms to competition policy, entry requirements, and privatizations. 
The most complete descriptions of product market reforms across EU countries are contained in 
the large number of papers and books that considered the implementation of the Single Market 
Programme, and a series of recent papers by researchers at the OECD.
37 We have used many of  
the sources described in the OECD papers where they are available to us.
38 We also use 
information from the Eurostat Structural Indicators.
39 Composite indicators are available from the 
Fraser Institute in their indices of economic freedom.
40 The Fraser Institute (FI) indices all range 
from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the lowest level of economic freedom (or highest level of 
regulation) and 10 indicating the highest level of economic freedom (or lowest level of 
                                                 
37 See, inter alia, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). 
38 It is beyond the scope of this project to engage in collection of new data. 
39http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=1-structur-
EN&mode=download. 
40 All the Fraser Institute data can be found at www.freetheworld.com   
  - 52 -
regulation). The FI indices refer to areas of regulation rather than specific regulations. However, 
they are based on a considerable amount of factual information, and in many cases the data 
underlying the series is also available. The key advantage of the FI indices is that they have been 
consistently collected over time.
41  
We have assembled and coded a large number of these indicators of regulations and reforms 
using data from the EU, OECD, Fraser Institute and other sources. We discuss them under the 
following categories: ease of starting a new business, trade, state involvement in the economy, 
administrative burden on business, and other controls.  
5.1.1  Ease of starting a new business 
Empirical work suggests that most of the total variation in entry across industries and over time 
is within industry rather than between industries.
42 This highlights the importance of obtaining 
time-varying data to identify the impact of entry on outcomes. In addition, the literature shows 
that the survival rate of entrants is low, and that significant market penetration is a lengthy 
process, with even successful entrants taking more than a decade to achieve a size comparable 
with the incumbent (see, e.g., Dunne et al., 1989). Past research has found only modest effects of 
entry on average industry price-cost margins (Geroski, 1990). 
The Fraser Institute compiles an index of the ease of starting a new business. This is  based on 
data from World Economic Forum’s  Global Competitiveness Report which includes surveys of 
business decision-makers on issues such as the number of permits to start a firm and the number 
of days required to start a firm. This survey captures businesses’ perception of regulation. The 
Fraser Institute reports this for 1995 and 2000, and we extrapolate the earliest value backwards to 
allow inclusion of the variable in our regressions while minimizing measurement error. The first 
two columns of Table 3 show the value of the Fraser Institute measures for 1995 and 2000. In all 
                                                 
41 Indices that start in 1990 or 1995 have been extrapolated backwards using the earliest available value. 
Identification of these indices thus comes only from the period over which they are actually collected. 
42 For example, see Geroski (1995).  
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countries except the UK it became easier to start a new business over the period (i.e. the value of 
the index increased).   
The OECD report a  number of indicators that are related to ease of entry. However, their data is 
only available for the year 1998. This means that we can not use them to explain economic 
performance over the late 1980s and 1990s. The values of these are shown in the next seven 
columns of Table 3. 
Table 3: Indicators of the ease of starting a new business 
 Fraser  Institute 
index of the ease 

































Year:  1995  2000  1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
             
Austria 3.7  5.4  7 5 8  2200  73000  2.8  4.0 
Belgium 4.6  6.4  3  4  6 1000  64000  1.5 1.8 
Denmark 6.3  6.5  2  2  1  300  68000  0.5 2.6 
Finland 8.5  8.8  7  1  6  1050  80000  1.5  0.8 
France  3.4  5.2  21 1 15  2200  40000  3.3  2.0 
Germany 5.0  6.4  8  2  24 750  50000  2.5 0.5 
Italy  4.1  5.1  21 4 22  7700  100000  5.3  3.0 
Netherlands 7.5 7.6  7  1  12  1400  46000  1.8  2.0 
Portugal 4.3  5.7  9  1  24  1000  25000  2.5 1.3 
Spain  5.3  5.7  12 5 28  330  62000  3.8  0.5 
Sweden 5.1  7.9  6  1  4  1130  60000  1.3  1.3 
UK 8.1  7.7  4  1  1  900  70000  0.8  1.3 
             
USA    8.4  8.4  5  6  2 200 0 0.8  1.3 
             
Sources: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom (2003); OECD International Regulation Database (1998); 
Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000), “Summary indicators of product market regulation”, OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper 
 
The first five are raw data from the OECD International Regulation Database. The final two are 
composite indicators constructed by economists at the OECD
43: “Administrative burdens on 
                                                 
43 See Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000), “Summary indicators of product market regulation”, OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper  
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startups (corporations)” is constructed from the raw OECD data on number of procedures, 
services, delays and costs, and “Legal barriers to entry” is constructed from the OECD 
Regulation Database question on “Government or regulations restricts number of entrants”. 
These indicators vary between 0 and 6 and are increasing in the restrictiveness of regulation. 
Other variables that are available in the OECD regulatory database but are not used here are 
those relating to ease of setting up as a Sole Proprietor. We think that these are not as relevant as 
Sole Proprietors represent a small part of activity in most countries. Finally we also use cross-
country data for 2002 from the European Commission on the time and cost associated with the 
registration of private limited companies.
44  
The cross-country correlations between the OECD and EU indicators and the 1995 value of the 
Fraser Institute index are shown in Table 4. We expect a negative correlation with all these 
indicators because the OECD measures are increasing in the degree of regulation while the 
Fraser Institute measure is decreasing in the degree of regulation. All the correlations are indeed 
negative, and there is a significant correlation between the Fraser Institute index for ease of 
starting a new business and the OECD measure relating to procedures required for starting a new 
business (-0.511) and the OECD index of “Administrative burden on startups” (-0.596). These 
suggest that the Fraser Institute variable is indeed measuring a real dimension of the ease of 
entry. The fact that the Fraser Institute index also has time-series variation makes it particularly 
valuable for our analysis, as it allows us to control for other unobservable differences that are 




                                                 
44 These are taken from European Commission (2002): Benchmarking the Administration of Business 
Start-ups, final report, Enterprise Directorate-General, January.  
  - 55 -
Table 4: Cross-country correlation between Fraser Institute index and other indicators 
   
Indicator  Correlation with Fraser Institute index 
of the ease of starting a new business 
Minimum number of procedures for entry (OECD)     -0.511 * 
Minimum number of services (OECD)  -0.457 
Maximum delay (weeks) (OECD)  -0.452 
Minimum cost (ECU) (OECD)  -0.361 
Minimum capital requirements (ECU) (OECD)  -0.188 
   
Administrative burdens on startups (OECD)       -0.596 ** 
Legal barriers to entry (OECD)  -0.383 
   
Cost of registration (EU)  -0.472 
Time for registration (EU)  -0.384 
   
Notes: 12 observations, 1995; * indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
We experimented with correlating these indicators with data on actual entry from the OECD 
Entry Database but had little success, largely because of small sample sizes. 
Note that we are capturing one facet of entry regulation, the ease of starting a new business. 
Entry through trade is considered in the next section. There are other forms of entry and entry 
barriers, such as the degree of entry deterring behaviour by incumbents and the extent to which 
existing firms enter new markets. These are more difficult to measure and are not as directly 
related to regulatory reform. We do not capture these aspects of barriers to entry here. 
5.1.2  Trade 
The theoretical literature suggests that lowering barriers to the inward flow of goods and services 
will increase the degree of competition and thus lead to reductions in the mark-up.  
The Fraser Institute reports an index of the average tariff rate for years from 1975 to 2000. The 
data on tariff rates come from a large number of sources, including the World Bank, the OECD, 
UNCTAD and GATT. There is not much differential variation in tariff rates across EU countries 
as rates were largely harmonized within the European Community prior to our sample period.  
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Thus, the only differential changes we see in average tariff rates over our 1985-2000 period are 
in Austria, Finland and Sweden before they joined the EU in 1995. Figure 13 plots the index of 
the average tariff rate by country. The overall trend is upwards, indicating reductions in the 
average tariff rate. Finland had fairly similar average tariff rates to the EU countries prior to 
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Figure 13: Fraser Institute index of the average tariff rate, 1985-2000.  
Source: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom (2003). 
 
The Fraser Institute also reports an index of regulatory trade barriers. This includes information 
on the number of hidden import barriers (barriers other than published tariffs and quotas). This  
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information is taken from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report and is 
available for 1995 and 2000. 
In Table 5 we present the cross-country correlations between the Fraser Institute index of 
regulatory trade barriers
45 (1995) and two OECD indices:
46 one measuring the extent of 
regulatory barriers to trade, which comes from a number of questions such has whether the 
country is engaged in mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) and whether the country has 
sought to internationally harmonise standards and procedures; and another measuring 
“Discriminatory procedures”, constructed from a range of questions about treatment of national 
versus foreign firms. Again, the OECD indicators are only measured in 1998 and so can not be 
used to explain economic performance over the 1980s and 1990s. The correlation coefficients in 
Table 5 are both significantly negative as expected, suggesting that the Fraser Institute index is a 
good measure of the extent of regulatory barriers to trade. As before, the key advantage of the 
Fraser Institute index is that it varies over time. 
Table 5: Correlation of Fraser Institute index with OECD indicators 
   
 
OECD indicator 
Correlation with Fraser Institute index of regulatory trade barriers 
  
Regulatory trade barriers  -0.612 ** 
Discriminatory procedures  -0.519 ** 
  
Notes: 12 observations, 1995; * indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
5.1.3  State involvement in the economy 
We aim to measure and control for several aspects of government involvement in the economy. 
Government involvement takes several forms. Governments are active in the production of many 
goods and services – most noticeably in the network industries (covered in an appendix) but also 
                                                 
45 All the indicators of tariffs are equal across EU countries after 1995, and so any correlations are all equal to one. 
46 See Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000), “Summary indicators of product market regulation”, OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper  
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in others (e.g. cars). This could limit the extent of competition as state monopolies or quasi-
monopolies have market power and the ability to deter entry. Government owned establishments 
may also be less efficient.
47 Another form of government involvement is through transfers and 
subsidies. These could help relatively inefficient firms to survive. Finally, government 
investment in public goods, such as infrastructure development and education, could reduce costs 
of private sector producers and lead to efficiency gains.  
A number of the Fraser Institute indices are potentially relevant here: “government transfers and 
subsidies as a % of GDP”, “government enterprises, and government investment as a % of total 
investment”, and “price controls”. The first two of these are available for 1975-2000, while 
“price controls” is available for 1990-2000. The indices are compiled primarily from the World 
Bank’s  World Development Indicators, the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, and the OECD Economic 
Surveys. 
We also have data from the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP) 
Statistical Review on the importance of enterprises with majority public participation. The 
measure we use is an average of the share of employees, value added and investment in the non-
agricultural business-enterprise sector represented by enterprises with majority public 
participation. All data concern enterprises with majority public participation in the non-
agricultural merchantable economy. This measure is collected in 1991, 1995 and 1998.  
We have also used three of the Eurostat Structural Indicators. These are “Sectoral and ad hoc 
state aids as a % of GDP” (1991-2000), “Public procurement as a % of GDP”
48 (1993-2000), and 
“Openly advertised public procurement as a % of public procurement” (1993-2000). 
                                                 
47 See Meggison and Netter (2001) for a survey of the empirical evidence in this area. 
48 We have constructed this from data on openly advertised public procurement as a % of GDP and openly 
advertised public procurement as a % of total public procurement.  
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Finally we have several indicators from the OECD that are all available for the year 1998 only. 
The first is a measure of state ownership as a % of non-agricultural business GDP in 1998, taken 
from the OECD International Regulation Database. The others are indices varying between 0 and 
6 constructed by economists at the OECD using various data sources.
49 These are: “Scope of the 
public enterprise sector”, constructed using data from the OECD International Regulation 
Database on government ownership of firms; “Size of the public enterprise sector”, constructed 
using data from the CEEP and various OECD sources; and “Price controls”, constructed using 
data from the OECD International Regulation Database on price controls in air travel, road 
freight, retail distribution and telecommunications. All these indices are increasing in the 
restrictiveness of regulation. 
Indicators of state involvement in the economy are listed in Table 6. In this section we compare 
the information contained in the different indicators and justify the choice of indicators that we 
use in our analysis. 
 Table 6: Indicators of state involvement in the economy 
Indicator Source  Years 
    
Government transfers and subsidies as a % of GDP  FI  1975 - 2000 
Government enterprises, and government investment as a % of total 
investment  FI  1975 - 2000 
Price controls  FI  1990 - 2000 
    
Share of enterprises with majority public participation in the non-
agricultural business sector  CEEP  1991, 1995, 1998 
    
Sectoral and ad hoc state aids as a percentage of GDP  EU  1991 - 2000 
Public procurement as a % of GDP  EU  1993 - 2000 
Openly advertised public procurement as a % of public procurement  EU  1993 - 2000 
    
State ownership as a % of non-agricultural business GDP  OECD  1998 
    
Scope of the public enterprise sector  OECD  1998 
Size of the public enterprise sector  OECD  1998 
Price controls  OECD  1998 
                                                 
49 See Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000), “Summary indicators of product market regulation”, OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper  
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The Fraser Institute index of price controls (1995) has a cross-country correlation with the 
OECD index of price controls of -0.593, which is significant at the 5% level. This is negative as 
expected (the first is increasing in economic freedom while the second is increasing in the 
restrictiveness of regulation), which suggests that the two indices are capturing similar aspects of 
price regulation. We use the Fraser Institute index in our analysis because it varies over time. 
In Table 7 we present the cross-country correlations for the year 1995 between the remaining 
two Fraser Institute indices, the CEEP measure of public enterprises and the other indicators. To 
aid interpretation of the results, all variables have been coded so that we would expect a positive 
correlation in each case if the indicators contain comparable information. In addition, 
correlations between indicators that we particularly expect a priori to contain similar information 
are shown in bold. 
Table 7: Correlations between indicators of state involvement in the economy 





Correlation with Fraser 
Institute index of 
transfers and subsidies 
Correlation with Fraser 
Institute index of  
government enterprises 
and investment 
Correlation with the 
CEEP measure of public 
enterprises 
CEEP measure of public 
enterprises 
0.253       0.699 **  - 
Sectoral and ad hoc state aids as 
a% of GDP (EU) 
-0.195  0.386     0.532 * 
Public procurement as a % of 
GDP (EU) 
0.188  0.402 0.320 
Openly advertised public 
procurement as a % of total (EU) 
0.314  0.289 0.415 
State ownership as a % of GDP 
(OECD) 
0.182     0.509 *       0.875 ** 
Scope of the public enterprise 
sector (OECD) 
0.080     0.572 *       0.645 ** 
Size of the public enterprise 
sector (OECD) 
0.211  0.358       0.793 ** 
Notes: 12 observations, 1995; correlations between indicators that we particularly expect a priori to contain similar 
information are shown in bold; * indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
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In the first column, the correlations with the Fraser Institute index of transfers and subsidies are 
generally low and insignificant, and the correlation between the index and the Eurostat indicator 
of state aids is in fact negative (-0.195). These results suggest that the index may not be 
capturing relevant information. One possibility is that variation in the Fraser Institute index is 
mostly dominated by government transfers in the form of unemployment insurance and other 
welfare payments, which are not directly relevant to product markets. For these reasons we do 
not use this index in our analysis. 
In the second column the correlations with the Fraser Institute index of government enterprises 
and investment are generally significant and positive where expected, particularly the correlation 
with the CEEP measure (0.699). However, the correlations in column (3) between the CEEP 
measure of public enterprises and the OECD indicators are even higher, suggesting that this is a 
better measure of the importance of public enterprises in the economy. For this reason we do not 
use the Fraser Institute index in our analysis, but we do use the CEEP indicator. 
In conclusion, the indicators of state involvement in the economy that we use in our analysis are 
the Fraser Institute index of price controls, the CEEP measure of the importance of public 
enterprises, and the Eurostat indicators. We do not use any of the OECD indicators because they 
have no time-series variation and are measured only at the end of our sample period (1998). This 
means that they cannot be used to explain changes in macroeconomic performance over the 
previous period. 
5.1.4  Administrative burden on business  
Our final indicator is a Fraser Institute index of “Time senior management spends with 
government bureaucracy”. This is based on survey responses from the World Economic Forum’s 
“Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002” and is available for the years 1995 and 2000. A 
large amount of time spent with government bureaucracy may constitute a barrier to entry, 
hinder firms’ expansion, or may indicate a significant amount of government involvement in 
business decision-making. We have very little other data to compare with this index. The most 
comparable indicator is a variable from the OECD International Regulation Database called  
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“Percentage of SMEs for which administrative burdens are a problem”, which is based on survey 
data available for 1998. The values for this and the Fraser Institute index are shown in Table 8. 
The fact that the OECD indicator refers only to SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) 
may mean that it is not exactly comparable with the Fraser Institute Index, but the two 
nevertheless have a cross-country correlation coefficient of  -0.484, although this is not quite 
significant at the 10% level. The correlation is expected to be negative because the OECD 
indicator is increasing in the burden of regulation. 
Table 8: Indicators of administrative burden 
  Fraser Institute index of time spent with government 
bureaucracy 
% of SMEs for which 
administrative burdens are a 
problem 
Year: 1995  2000  1998 
      
Austria   6.5  7.4  34 
Belgium 6.5  8.9  33 
Denmark 8.9  8.2  23 
Finland 8.5  8.5  20 
France 6.3  8.1  36 
Germany 6.5  8.5  31 
Italy 4.7  6.1  35 
Netherlands   7.4  9.1  24 
Portugal 5.5  7.2  38 
Spain 6.4  7.9  13 
Sweden   8.3  8.3  28 
UK 7.8  8.0  35 
     
USA   7.5  8.2  - 
      
Sources: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom (2003); OECD International Regulation Database 
5.1.5  Other controls 
In our econometric analysis below we also control for changes in labour market and  credit 
market regulations. We use Fraser Institute indices of both these areas of regulation, which are 
collected for the years 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The index of labour market regulations is 
constructed from information in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
2001-2002 on the impact of minimum wage legislation, hiring and firing practices, collective  
  - 63 -
bargaining, and unemployment insurance.  The index of credit market regulation is constructed 
from information on bank ownership, the extent of competition from foreign banks, the 
percentage of credit extended to the private sector, and interest rate controls. Sources include the 
World Bank, Price Waterhouse, the Global Competitiveness Report, and the IMF’s International 
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Figure 14: Fraser Institute index of credit market regulation, 1985-2000.  
Source: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom (2003). 
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Figure 15: Fraser Institute index of labour market regulation, 1985-2000. 
Source: Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom (2003). 
5.1.6  Relationship between these indicators and Single Market Program. 
Since our investigations span the years 1985-2000, they will most notably reflect the impact of 
the Single Market Program (SMP) on the European economy. The measures taken under this 
initiative are detailed in the Commission’s 1985 White Paper, and aim to guarantee the “four 
freedoms” to move capital, labour, goods and services. Several of the SMP measures will be 
picked up by our regulation variables. Most obviously, the abolition of all protective national 
measures will be picked up by the Fraser Institute’s tariff index.  
Public procurement data is available from Eurostat for the years following 1993, which might 
still capture the effects of opening up public procurement procedures and extending them to 
previously sheltered markets.   
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Finally, the ease of starting up a business and the regulatory burden on business have been 
improved by the SMP program, notably through fiscal simplification. 
As additional controls we use credit market regulations. The credit market has been an area of 
much activity for the SMP, with the coordination of national credit institutions and important 
legal harmonisation. 
5.2  Impact of product market reforms on performance 
As discussed in Section 4, our main methodology is a two-stage approach. The approach is 
motivated by theoretical models that highlight the available level of rents as a key determinant of 
factor demands and incentives for efficiency enhancement and innovation. We first estimate the 
relationship between our chosen indicators of product market reforms and the mark-up. In the 
second stage we then estimate the relationship between the mark-up and aspects of 
macroeconomic performance, using our indicators of product market reform as instruments for 
the mark-up. We thus control for possible endogeneity of the mark-up due to shocks that affect 
rents and macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously. In the following sections we first present 
results for the aggregate economy and then for the manufacturing and service sectors. We then 
present results from regressions of macroeconomic performance directly on the indicators of 
product market reforms. These serve as a robustness check for our main two-stage results. 
5.2.1  Product market reforms and the mark-up in the total business sector 
We start by considering the relationship between the product market reforms described above 
and the markup in the aggregate business enterprise sector (ISIC 01-99). These results are shown 
in Table 9, where numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. All the explanatory variables 
are scaled so that a higher number means less regulation or government involvement. If less 
regulation was associated with lower markups this would be reflected in a negative coefficient. 
These measures reflect different features of the economic environment, and the results point to 
the problems that can arise if regulatory measures are combined into a single aggregate index, as  
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is done in much empirical work. As shown by the widely varying coefficients, imposing a priori 
that they all have the same impact on competition (markups) would be seriously misleading. We 
now turn to a discussion of the relation between each of the indicators of product market 
regulation and the mark-up to highlight these points. 
In the first column we include indicators of the main reforms discussed above, as well as country 
and year effects to control for unobservable characteristics that differ across countries but are 
constant over time (including measurement error) as well as to control for common macro 
variation. In column (2) we control for labour and credit market regulations, as these may also 
affect markups, and in column (3) we also control for country specific business cycles (measured 
as deviations from trend output).
50 Columns (4) to (6) repeat this exercise for the 1990s only, 
where our data is more complete. In the final column we include only those variables where we 
have complete information, in other words where we have not extrapolated backwards the 
earliest available value. The coefficients in column (7) are very similar to those in column (6), 
indicating that the presence of extrapolated data is not seriously affecting the other coefficients. 
Focusing on our preferred specifications in columns (3) and (6) we see that the mark-up is lower 
when entry is easier and the average tariff is lower. Regulatory trade barriers are only 
significantly related to mark-ups over the 1990s, and only when we do not allow for country 
specific business cycles. Time with government bureaucracy is only significantly related to 
mark-ups when we do not control for country specific business cycles (in this case mark-ups are 
lower when firms report spending less time with government bureaucracy). The mark-up is 
higher when there are less price controls and when there is less involvement of government via 
the public enterprise sector.  
The R
2 is high in all specifications, indicating that these variables explain a substantial share of 
the variation in the mark-up. This suggests that they are strong instruments. The country effects 
are jointly significant in all specifications. 
                                                 
50 Our measure of the output gap is taken from the OECD’s Economic Outlook (2002)  
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These coefficients generally make economic sense. Price controls often act to keep prices, and 
thus mark-ups, down artificially. When they are loosened it is likely that prices will rise. 
Similarly, for the CEEP measure of the scale of the public enterprise sector, government 
producers do not seek to maximize profits, and may thus set prices lower or have higher costs 
than private sector producers. We also see that lower levels of labour market regulation and 
easier access to credit are associated with lower mark-ups. Both these types of regulation may in 
part capture ease of entry. The output gap is positively associated with mark-ups – our measured 
mark-ups tend to be pro-cyclical.  
What about the economic importance of these results? Consider the coefficient on “ease of 
starting a new business”, which is –0.021 in column (3). This suggests that regulations or 
reforms that increase the index by 1 would reduce the markup by about 2.1 percentage points, 
which would represent about an 8% fall in the average mark up over value added.
51 Reforms that 
increased the index by around 1 between 1995 and 2000 took place in Germany, Italy and 
Portugal.  
We now use all the variables included in column (3) as instruments for the markup when we 
correlate the markup with macro economic performance and factor demands. This is equivalent 
to using the coefficients in column (3) to calculate a predicted markup and including that in the 
second-stage regression. We have experimented with using different groups of product market 
reforms as instruments, and the results in the second stage are robust to different combinations of 
instruments. Standard errors in the second stage regressions have been adjusted to account for 
the use of instrumental variables. 
                                                 
51 This is 0.02/0.25, where 0.25 is the average mark-up in the sample.  
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Table 9: Product market reforms and mark-up, aggregate business sector 
Dependent variable: 
markup 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         























































































         




















Output gap      0.004 ** 
(0.001) 




         
R  squared  0.930 0.940 0.946 0.931 0.953 0.957 0.955 
Test of country effects  20.62 **  25.46 **  28.89 **  20.77 **  34.16 **  36.44 **  85.14 ** 
Observations:  181 181 181 129 129 129 129 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
5.2.2  Employment  
We look at the relationship between the markup and levels of employment in Table 10. In 
column (1) we show the relationship between the markup and the log level of employment, 
including year and country effects. In column (2) we include the output gap to control for 
cyclical variations in employment. In columns (3) and (4) we use our preferred instrumental 
variables estimator, where the instruments are as shown in column (3) of Table 9. We instrument  
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because we are concerned about the likely endogeneity of the markup with respect to 
employment. Industries that are growing will experience shocks that lead to changes in both 
employment and profitability. If the effects of shocks on profitability and employment are 
positively correlated we would see a spurious positive correlation between employment and the 
mark-up. This means we would expect an upward bias in the coefficient on the markup. When 
we control for endogeneity in columns (3) and (4) we see that the coefficient becomes more 
negative as expected. In a test of endogeneity bias we find that the bias is significant at the 1% 
level.
52 
 Table 10: Markup and employment, aggregate business sector 
Dependent variable: 
ln(employment) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 



























Ease of starting a new business      -0.032 ** 
(0.009) 
      
      
No. of overidentifying restrictions 








      
Observations:  181 181 181 181 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
                                                 
52 The test follows the “control function” approach. We include the estimated residual from the first stage regression 
as a regressor in the second stage. In a linear regression this is exactly equivalent to two-stage instrumental variables 
and the coefficient on the estimated first-stage residual acts as a test of endogeneity. In the specification in column 
(3) the coefficient on the first-stage residual is 1.07 with a robust t-statistic of more than 5.  
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For the instrumental variables estimates we present the results of a Sargan test of the over-
identifying restrictions. In column (3) all eight PMR instruments are excluded from the main 
employment regression; in other words we assume that they are not correlated with the 
unexplained variation in the dependent variable, the log of employment. Since the mark-up is the 
only variable being instrumented, this results in 7 over-identifying restrictions. If the 
assumptions underlying the exclusion of these variables from the employment regression are not 
valid then the estimated coefficient on the mark-up may be biased.  
The Sargan test in column (3) strongly rejects the assumptions underlying the exclusion 
restrictions. However, the test on its own does not provide any guidance on which of the 
excluded instruments should be included directly in the employment regression. In order to 
investigate this we use the technique described in Section 4. We took the residuals from the 
regression in column (3) and regressed them on all of the exogenous variables in the model – 
these are all the policy indicators, the output gap, and the country and year dummies. We will 
call this the “residuals regression”. In this case the only policy indicator with a statistically 
significant coefficient in the residuals regression was the indicator of “ease of starting a new 
business”, which had a negative coefficient. This suggests that this indicator should be included 
directly in the main employment regression. We do this in column (4) and, as expected, the 
coefficient is negative and significant. The Sargan test now does not reject the remaining six 
over-identifying exclusion restrictions, even at the 10% level. The main coefficient of interest is 
the one on the mark-up, which is very similar to that in column (3). This suggests that, while the 
exclusion of the “ease of starting a new business” indicator from the employment regression was 
not supported by the data, it did not seriously bias the estimate of the coefficient on the mark-up. 
Nevertheless, the preferred specification is the one in column (4). 
The negative coefficient on the “ease of starting a new business” indicator in column (4) 
suggests that reforms that make it easier to start a new business are associated with lower levels 
of employment in a way that is not channeled through the mark-up, or level of rents. At first 
sight this a counterintuitive result. However, to obtain the overall effect of this indicator we need 
to combine this direct effect with the indirect effect that works through the mark-up. We can  
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calculate the indirect effect by combining the effect of the indicator on the mark-up from column 
(3) of Table 9 with the effect of the mark-up on employment from column (4) of Table 10. Thus 
we multiply the coefficient on the “ease of starting a new business” indicator from column (3) of 
Table 9, which is  -0.021, with the coefficient on the mark-up in column (4) of Table 10, which 
is –1.632. This gives a positive indirect effect of  0.034. This indirect effect works in exactly the 
opposite direction to the direct effect, so that reforms that make it easier to start a new business 
are associated with lower mark-ups and thus higher levels of employment. In this case it turns 
out that the direct and indirect effects of the indicator almost exactly cancel each other out          
(-0.032 and +0.034 respectively), and the overall effect is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
In all specifications, the relationship between the markup and the log level of employment is 
negative and significant suggesting that lower mark-ups are associated with higher levels of 
employment. This corresponds well with the theoretical predictions discussed above. 
We can combine the coefficients on the product market reform indicators from the first stage in 
Table 9 with those on the mark-up from the second stage to determine the ultimate effect of 
product market regulations on macro-economic outcomes as mediated through the mark-up, or 
level of rents. For the indicators that are excluded from the employment regression in the final 
specification (in other words all except the “ease of starting a new business” indicator) this 
indirect effect is the only relevant channel.  
Consider the coefficient on “average tariff rate” in column (3) of Table 9, which is –0.046. As 
discussed earlier, this suggests that regulations or reforms that increase the index by 1 would 
reduce the markup by about 4.6 percentage points. This is a very large change: for example 
Austria experienced an increase in the index of 0.4 points between 1990 and 1995. This 
corresponded to a reduction in the average tariff rate from 8.5% to 6.5%, where the average tariff 
rate is defined as “revenue from taxes on trade as a share of the trade sector”. This is about a 
25% reduction in the average tariff rate.  
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We can combine this coefficient with that on the instrumented mark-up in column (4) of Table 
10, which is equal to -1.632 . Thus an increase of 0.4 points in the “average tariff rate” index (a 
reduction in the average tariff rate) is associated with a 1.8 percentage point reduction in the 
mark-up, which is in turn associated with about a 3% increase in the level of employment.
53 This 
is a large change in the mark-up, which thus leads to a correspondingly large effect on 
employment. Given that the average mark-up in our sample is 0.25, this corresponds to an 
elasticity of employment with respect to the mark-up of about  -0.4 %.
54 
5.2.3  Investment 
In Table 11 we look at the relationship between the markup and the log level of gross fixed 
capital formation. Again, we first show the relationship between them with year and country 
effects included in column (1), then condition on the output gap in column (2) and then use an 
instrument variables estimator in columns (3) and (4). Here we also find a negative and 
significant relationship, with the instrumental variables estimates being significantly more 
negative as before. A test for endogeneity again rejects the hypothesis of no endogeneity bias at 
the 1% level.
55 Overall, these results correspond well with the theoretical predictions and 
empirical results in the paper by Alesina at al (2003) discussed above. 
                                                 
53 An increase of +0.03 in the log level is approximately equal to a 3% increase in the level. 
54 A 1% change in the mark-up is about 0.0025 percentage points, which leads to a change of about 0.4% in the level 
of employment (0.0025 times 1.632 is equal to about 0.004). 
55 In a control function specification, the coefficient on the first stage residual in the specification of column (3) is 
1.17 with a robust t-statistic of more than 3.  
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Table 11: Markup and gross fixed capital formation, aggregate business sector 
Dependent variable:  
ln(gross fixed capital formation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 



























Credit market regulation 




Average tariff rate 




Time with government bureaucracy      -0.053 ** 
(0.016) 
      
      
No. of overidentifying restrictions 








      
Observations:  181 181 181 181 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
As was the case with employment, the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions strongly rejects 
in Column (3). Using the same technique as above, the results of the “residuals regression” from 
this specification suggested that three of the policy instruments should be included directly in the 
investment regression. These were the indicators of “credit market regulation”, “average tariff 
rate”, and “time with government bureaucracy”. When we include these three variables in 
Column (4) they all enter significantly and the Sargan test does not reject the remaining over-
identifying restrictions. As before, the coefficients on the mark-up and the output gap are not 
significantly different from Column (3). 
The positive direct effect of the “credit market regulation” indicator on investment acts in the 
expected direction: lower levels of regulation are associated with higher levels of investment.  
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The indicator did not have a significant effect on the mark-up in Column (3) of Table 9, 
suggesting that there is no evidence for an indirect effect through the level of rents.  
The positive direct effect of the “average tariff rate” indicator suggests that lower average tariffs 
are associated with higher levels of investment. In this case the direct effect acts in the same 
direction as the indirect effect that acts through the level of rents. The “average tariff rate” has a 
significant negative coefficient of  -0.046 in Column (3) of Table 9, which combines with the 
estimated negative coefficient on the mark-up in Column (4) of Table 11 to give a positive 
indirect effect of the indicator on investment of 0.132. This is of the same order as the direct 
effect, which is 0.189.  
The significant negative effect of the “time with government bureaucracy” indicator suggests 
that less time spent with bureaucracy is associated with lower levels of investment. However, 
when combined with the small positive indirect effect via the mark-up the overall effect of the 
indicator is not significantly different from zero even at the 10% level.
56 
The scale of the negative relationship between the mark-up and gross fixed capital formation is 
again large. For example the results in column (4) suggest that a reduction of 1 percentage point 
in the mark-up is associated with about a 2.9% higher level of fixed capital investment. Given 
that the average mark-up in our sample is 0.25, this corresponds to an elasticity of gross fixed 
capital formation with respect to the mark-up of about  –0.7 %.  
5.2.4  Comparison with QUEST 
We can compare these estimated results for the mark-up, employment and gross fixed capital 
formation with predictions generated by the QUEST general equilibrium model. In Tables 12 
and 13 we present the results of two QUEST simulations and compare the results to the 
                                                 
56 The indirect effect is calculated as –0.009 * -2.877 = 0.026, where the first number is taken from Column (3) of 
Table 9, and the second is the coefficient on the mark-up in Column (4) of Table 11. This makes an overall effect of 
–0.027.  
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predictions generated by our estimated coefficients in column (4) of Table 10 and Table 11. The 
first simulation is a 0.5% reduction in the mark-up in Germany from 17% to 16.5%. The second 
simulation is a 0.5% reduction in the mark-up for all the EU15 countries. In both cases we 
present the resulting percentage change in employment and investment in Germany after 5 years, 
and in the second simulation we also present the change in the EU15 countries overall. In both 
cases most of the impact has occurred after 2 or 3 years, so the effects presented can be viewed 
as long-run effects. The predicted effect using our estimated coefficients is the same in both 
cases, whether the change is only in Germany or in the EU15 countries. 
Table 12: QUEST simulation (1) : 0.5% reduction in the mark-up in Germany 
  % change in employment  % change in investment  
Predicted effect after 5 years 
in Germany from:    
    
Our estimated coefficients  0.81 %  1.44 % 
    
QUEST  0.66 %  1.06 % 
    
Notes: the estimated coefficients are taken from column (4) of Table 10 and Table 11 
Table 13: QUEST simulation (2) : 0.5% reduction in the mark-up in EU15 
  % change in employment  % change in investment  
Predicted effect after 5 years: 
    
    
Our estimated coefficients  0.81 %  1.44 % 
    
QUEST (Germany)  0.69 %  1.25 % 
    
QUEST (EU15)  0.65 %  1.08 % 
    
Notes: the estimated coefficients are taken from column (4) of Table 10 and Table 11 
 
Encouragingly, the predictions from QUEST are very similar to those generated by our estimated 
coefficients, although our predicted effects are always slightly larger. These results lend support 
to our analytical approach. If we believe that our second stage results are the correct order of 
magnitude, this suggests that our first stage estimates of the effects of product market reforms on  
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the mark-up can be combined with the second stage results to estimate the ultimate effect of the 
reforms on macroeconomic outcomes. 
5.2.5  R&D 
We next look at the relationship between the mark-up and investment in research and 
development (R&D) in Table 14. Columns (1) and (2) are OLS, while columns (3), (4) and (5) 
use our instrumental variables approach. In columns (1) and (3) the mark-up is positively 
associated with R&D expenditure, suggesting that when there are more economic rents in an 
economy there is also more investment in R&D. In other words more competition is associated 
with less R&D. In columns (2) and (4) we include a squared term to investigate whether the 
impact is non-linear, as has been suggested in the literature.
57 We see something of a non-linear 
affect, but this only turns downwards at high levels of economic rents that are observed only in 
one country – Italy.  
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions strongly rejects the exclusion restrictions in 
Columns (3) and (4). Using the same technique as before we include four of the policy indicators 
directly in Column (5). All four enter significantly and the Sargan test no longer rejects the 
remaining two over-identifying restrictions. Neither the coefficient on the mark-up nor that on 
the squared term are significantly different from those in Column (4), although the joint 
hypothesis that both coefficients are the same as in Column (4) is rejected at the 5% level. The 
overall shape of the inverted-U relationship is slightly shallower than in Column (4), and the 
relationship becomes downwards-sloping at a slightly lower level of the mark-up. Nevertheless, 
Italy remains the only country with levels of the mark-up where reducing the level of rents is 
associated with higher levels of R&D.  
Figure 16 shows the predicted relationship between log R&D expenditure and the mark-up based 
on the estimated coefficients in column (5). Every point represents a country-year observation in 
                                                 
57 See for example Aghion et al (2002).  
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our sample, so it is clear that most countries are in the upwards sloping range. Below we explore 
how this relationship varies across manufacturing and service sectors and find a larger 
downwards sloping section in manufacturing where most R&D expenditure is observed. 
Table 14:  Markup and R&D, aggregate business sector 
Dependent variable: ln(R&D)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
















































Ease of starting a new business 




Average tariff rate 




Regulatory trade barriers 




CEEP measure of public 
enterprises       0.045 ** 
(0.012) 
       
       
No. of overidentifying 












       
Observations:  100 100 100 100 100 
Countries:  8 8 8 8 8 
Years:  1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
The direct effect of three of the indicators in Column (5) is negative, suggesting that fewer 
barriers to starting a new business, a lower average tariff rate and lower regulatory trade barriers 
are all associated with lower levels of R&D in ways that are not mediated through the level of  
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rents. Meanwhile, a smaller public enterprise sector is associated with higher levels of R&D. All 
these direct effects are much larger than the associated indirect effects.  
5.2.6  Labour productivity 
We now look at the relationship between the mark-up and value-added per hour worked in the 
business enterprise sector (a measure of labour productivity). As above, numbers in () are 
standard errors and all regressions include country and year dummies and the output gap.
58 In 
column (1) of Table 15 we see that there is a positive linear relationship between the mark-up 
and labour productivity. In column (2) we include a squared term and see that this effect lessens 
at higher levels of the markup. However the relationship remains positive for all observed values 
of the mark-up. In columns (3) and (4) we use an instrumental variables estimator, where the 
instruments are as above. The overall positive relationship remains in Column (3), but the 
coefficients on the mark-up and its square are no longer significant in Column (4), although they 
are jointly significant. 
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions strongly rejects in Columns (3) and (4). Using the 
same technique as above we include three policy indicators directly in Column (5). All three 
enter significantly and the Sargan test of the remaining three over-identifying restrictions no 
longer rejects. The coefficients on the mark-up and its square are both larger than in Column (4), 
although neither is significantly different from before. The joint hypothesis that the two 
coefficients are as in Column (4) is not rejected at the 5% level. Both coefficients are 
significantly different from zero, but as before the relationship between the mark-up and the 
level of labour productivity never becomes downwards sloping. 
The direct effects of the three included policy indicators are all positive as expected. Thus lower 
barriers to starting a new business, a lower average tariff rate, and less restrictive credit market 
regulations are all associated with higher levels of labour productivity in ways that are not 
                                                 
58 The results in this section are not significantly different if the output gap is not included.  
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mediated through the level of rents. Calculating the associated indirect effects is complicated by 
the non-linear relationship between the mark-up and the level of labour productivity. For 
simplicity, we calculate the indirect effect at the average level of the mark-up in the sample, 
which is 1.25. On this basis, the small positive direct effect of the “ease of starting a new 
business” indicator is almost exactly offset by the negative indirect effect which is equal to         
–0.027.
59 The positive direct effects of the “average tariff rate” and “credit market regulation” 
indicators are only partially offset by their indirect effects which are –0.059 and –0.006 
respectively. 
The predicted relationship between the log level of labour productivity and the mark-up based on 
column (5) of Table 15 is shown in Figure 17. We see that the positive relationship between the 
mark-up and the level of labour productivity is lower at higher levels of the markup, but it is 
never decreasing. This positive relationship with the level of labour productivity is interesting. 
There are several possible explanations. One is suggested by the negative relationship between 
the level of employment and the mark-up that we found above. If new workers absorbed into the 
workforce have lower levels of skills, or work with less capital, than those already in work, then 
an expansion of employment associated with a lower mark-up will be associated with a lower 
overall level of labour productivity. The same effect would be seen if the new jobs are more 
concentrated in lower productivity sectors than existing jobs.
60 We show below that the estimated 
negative relationship between employment and the mark-up is much larger in the service sector 
than in manufacturing.  
 
                                                 
59 This is calculated as –0.021 * {5.667 – (2*1.755*1.25)}, where the first number is taken from Column (3) of 
Table 9, and the expression in brackets is the marginal effect of the mark-up on the level of labour productivity, 
calculated at the average value of the mark-up, which is 1.25. 
60 Equally, if workers who leave the workforce worked in lower productivity jobs than those who remain employed, 
then a reduction in employment associated with a higher mark-up will be associated with a higher overall level of 
labour productivity.  
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Table 15: Mark-up and labour productivity, aggregate business sector 
dependent variable: 
ln (value-added per hour worked) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















































Ease of starting a new business 




Average tariff rate 




Credit market regulation 
       0.021 * 
(0.013) 
       
       
No. of overidentifying restrictions 












       
Observations:  181 181 181 181 181 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. * indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates 
significance at 5% level. 
 
A second, and possibly related, potential explanation is that issues of timing and dynamics are 
crucial for understanding the true relationship between the level of rents and labour productivity. 
For example, Olley and Pakes (1996) do not find any effect of regulatory changes on within-firm 
productivity, but suggest that such an effect might be observed in a longer time-series of data. 
We return to this issue below. Finally it is possible that the positive coefficient is capturing mis-
measurement in true labour productivity in the presence of markups. As with TFP (see 
Appendix) labour productivity will be overestimated when markets are less competitive.  
Figures 16 to 23 investigate the relationship in some depth. In Figure 16 we plot the average 
markup for each country over the period on the x-axis and the average level of productivity for  
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each country on the y-axis. We see that there is no obvious relationship between the two, 
especially if we exclude Italy, which is an outlier. We do not use this cross-country variation in 
our econometric analysis because we want to control for measurement and other unobservable 
differences across countries that are constant over time.  
AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1 AUS 1
BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2 BEL 2
DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3 DE N 3
FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4 FIN 4
FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5 FRA 5
DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6 DEU 6
ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9 ITA 9
NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10 NLD 10
POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11 POR 11
SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12 SPA 12
SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13 SWE 13
























































1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
mean mark-up
 
Figure 16: Mean log level of labour productivity and mark-up, aggregate economy, 1985-2000.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
In Figure 17 we plot the markup (x-axis) against the level of labour productivity (y-axis) for each 
country year observation, after we have removed country fixed effects, common year effects and 
the country specific business cycle (as measured by the output gap). Here we see a clear positive 
relationship, and it is this within-country relationship that is picked up in our econometric results.   
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Figure 17: Log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and output gap, 
aggregate economy, 1985-2000. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
In Figure 18 we plot the same variables by country. Several aspects of this figure suggest that the 
relationship between our measured mark-up and the level of labour productivity is far from 
simple. First, the within-country relationship is not homogeneous across countries. Some 
countries such as Finland, Spain and Sweden show a clear positive relationship, others such as 
Austria and Denmark show no clear relationship at all, and countries such as Italy and Portugal 
suggest a negative relationship.   
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Figure 18: log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and output gap, 
aggregate economy, 1985-2000, by country. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
Even in this description, however, there are further subtleties. Figure 19 shows the relationship in 
Finland with the year of each observation marked. Labour productivity is rising over time once 
we have controlled for the cycle, a fixed country effect and common year effects. This means 
that labour productivity was rising faster in Finland than the average for the sample. However, 
the relationship between labour productivity and the mark-up shows two distinct parts. From 
1985 to 1989 there is a clear negative relationship between the two after controlling for the cycle, 
a country fixed effect and common year effects. Then during the severe recession between 1989 
and 1991 the mark-up and labour productivity both fall, and from 1991 to 2000 there is a strong 
positive relationship as both are rising. This suggests that there may have been a structural break 
in the relationship between labour productivity and the mark-up around the time of the recession. 
Whether this is due to measurement issues or real changes in the structure of the economy is very  
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hard to say without further analysis, possibly with more disaggregated data. Alternatively, a 
more homogenous relationship might be observed over a much longer time period that was not 
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Figure 19: Finland. Log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 
output gap, aggregate economy, 1985-2000. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
Figures 20 to 23 show the same graph for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. All four show very 
different stories. France and Germany show a positive relationship only between 1992 and 1995, 
with very little obvious relationship either before or afterwards. Italy shows a negative 
relationship as labour productivity falls and the mark-up rises relative to the sample average (i.e. 
after controlling for common year effects), although between 1986 and 1993 there is little change 
in the mark-up. Spain shows a positive relationship similar to Finland in the 1990s, except that 
both labour productivity and the mark-up fall relative to the sample average instead of rise. 
These very different experiences raise the question of whether it is possible to impose a common 
structure across different countries. Essentially we should ask whether the experience of other 
EU countries is a suitable counterfactual for estimating the effects of changes in any particular  
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country. An alternative strategy would be to look at firms or industries within a country that were 
affected by the reforms and compare their performance to those that were not affected, or to pick 
relevant groups of countries which share similar characteristics to act as controls (this is what is 
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Figure 20: France. Log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 
output gap, aggregate economy, 1985-2000. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
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Figure 21: Germany. Log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 

































































mark-up, after country effects, year effects and output gap
 
 
Figure 22: Italy. Log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 
output gap, aggregate economy, 1985-2000. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
  











































































mark-up, after country effects, year effects and output gap
 
Figure 23: Spain. Log level of labour productivity and mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 
output gap, aggregate economy, 1985-2000. Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data. 
5.2.7  Growth of Labour Productivity 
Several of the potential explanations presented above for a positive relationship between the 
mark-up and the level of labour productivity might have different implications if we consider the 
effect of mark-ups on the growth of labour productivity. For example, if newly created jobs have 
lower labour productivity on average than existing jobs, then an expansion of employment 
associated with a lower mark-up will be associated with a reduction in labour productivity 
growth, but only while employment is growing. Once employment has reached a new level, the 
growth rate of labour productivity may rise again, even though the level of labour productivity 
may remain lower for some time. However, the ability to capture these dynamics is very 
dependent on observing a long enough time-series of data, especially since many of the product 
market reforms we are considering took place in the middle and towards the end of our sample 
period. 
 The relationship between the growth in labour productivity and the markup is presented in Table 
16. In column (1) we see that there is a positive and significant linear relationship using OLS. In 
column (2) we allow for non-linearities, but the quadratic term is not significant. In columns (3)  
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and (4) we use our instrumental variables estimator. In this case the Sargan test does not reject 
the over-identifying restrictions. The linear relationship in Column (3) is positive as before, but 
only significant at the 10% level. The squared term enters negatively and significantly in Column 
(4), but the relationship is again only downwards sloping for high values of the mark-up - values 
that are observed only in Italy. Figure 24 shows the predicted relationship between the growth of 
labour productivity and the mark-up using the coefficients from column (4). Interestingly, the 
curve is extremely similar to that for R&D in Figure 25, peaking at a mark-up of about 1.3, and 
with most observations in the upwards sloping range. 
Table 16: Markup and growth in labour productivity, aggregate business sector. 
dependent variable: 
ln (growth in value-added per hour 
worked) 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
















mark up squared    -0.202 
(0.127) 
 
 -0.477  * 
(0.250) 
 








        
No. of overidentifying restrictions 
 




Observations: 180  180  180  180 






Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% level. 
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Figure 24: Predicted relationship between growth of labour productivity and the mark-up, aggregate economy. 
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Figure 25: Predicted relationship between log R&D expenditure and the mark-up, aggregate economy. 
Source: Authors calculations; based on Column (5) of Table 14. 
 
 
The fact that we observe a weak positive relationship between the mark-up and the growth rate 
of labour productivity is consistent with our earlier potential explanation for the levels  
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relationship. While it is happening, an expansion in employment associated with a lower mark-
up will be associated with lower labour productivity growth if the new jobs have below-average 
labour productivity. In a relatively short panel like the one we are using we may mostly observe 
this transition phase, and not the subsequent phase where the levels of the mark-up and 
employment have stopped changing. It may that this later phase will be characterized by faster 
productivity growth, but we would not observe it in our sample. 
In Figure 26 we plot the average markup for each country over the period on the x-axis and the 
average growth rate of labour productivity for each country on the y-axis. There is clearly a 
negative relationship on average, so that a lower average mark-up is associated with a higher 
average growth rate of productivity. However, as before, our econometric analysis does not use 
this cross-country variation because we want to control for measurement and other unobservable 
differences across countries that are constant over time. If we repeat the specification in column 
(3) of Table 16 but exclude the country effects, thus allowing the “between” variation to be 
picked up by the results as well as “within” variation, then the estimated relationship is 
significantly negative, with a coefficient on the mark-up of  -0.027 and a robust standard error of 
0.013. In this case there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship.  
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Figure 26: Mean growth of labour productivity against the mark-up, aggregate economy, 1985-2000.  
Source: Author’s calculations using OECD data. 
In Figure 27 we plot the markup (x-axis) against the growth rate of labour productivity (y-axis) 
for each country year observation, after we have removed country fixed effects, common year 
effects and the country specific business cycle (as measured by the output gap). As suggested by 
our econometric results in Table 16, there appears to be a weak positive relationship on average, 
but Figure 28 shows that this is again heterogeneous across countries.  
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Figure 27: Growth of labour productivity and level of the mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 
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Figure 28: Growth of labour productivity and level of the mark-up after removing country effects, year effects and 
output gap, aggregate economy, 1985-2000, by country. Source: Author’s calculations using OECD data.  
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The fact that we observe a negative relationship between growth in labour productivity and the 
mark-up between countries but a positive relationship within countries could be interpreted in 
several ways. The “between” result is less robust in the sense that it does not control for 
unobservable differences across countries that are constant over time, and in particular 
differences in the measurement of the mark-up. However, the difference between the results is 
also consistent with our earlier potential explanation based on the creation of new jobs that are 
below average labour productivity. If in our panel we mainly observe a transitional phase where 
a lower mark-up is associated with higher employment at the expense of labour productivity 
growth, then the within-country variation will be dominated by a negative relationship between 
the mark-up and labour productivity growth.
61  
5.2.8  Total Factor Productivity  
We now look at the relationship between the predicted markup and total factor productivity 
levels and growth rates. Again with the level of total factor productivity (Table 17) we find a 
positive linear relationship using OLS in column (1). The quadratic term in column (2) is 
significant but never results in a downward sloping relationship. In columns (3), (4) and (5) we 
use our preferred instrumental variables estimator. The results in columns (3) and (4) are 
qualitatively similar to those in the first two columns, although the size of the coefficients is 
larger. However, the Sargan test rejects the over-identifying restrictions in both cases. Using the 
same technique as above we include two policy indicators directly in column (5). Both are 
significant and the Sargan test does not reject the remaining four over-identifying restrictions. 
The coefficients on the mark-up and its square are smaller than in column (4) and are not 
significant, although they are jointly significant at the 5% level. However, they are not 
significantly different from those in column (4). The positive overall relationship remains. 
                                                 
61 The same effect within countries would be observed if there was a transitional phase where a higher mark-up is 
associated with lower employment and thus higher labour productivity growth.  
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Table 17: Markup and level of total factor productivity, aggregate business sector 
dependent variable: 
ln (level of total factor 
productivity) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















































Average tariff rate 




CEEP measure of public 
enterprises       -0.008 ** 
(0.003) 
       
       
No. of over-identifying restrictions 












       
Observations:  181 181 181 181 181 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. * indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates 
significance at 5% level 
 
As was the case with labour productivity there are a number of possible explanations of this 
result, particularly involving the importance of timing and dynamics. The problem of mis-
measurement of TFP in the presence of positive mark-ups is also of concern, as higher markups 
will result in higher measured TFP (see Appendix for technical discussion).  
In Table 18 we consider the relationship between the markup and the growth in total factor 
productivity. Again when we simply include the linear term we see a positive relationship with 
both the OLS and instrumental variables estimators.
62 The quadratic term is significant in both 
                                                 
62  The Sargan test rejects the over-identifying retrictions in Column (3). However, once we allow for a non-linear 
relationship between the mark-up and the growth of TFP the Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying 
restrictions in Column (4).   
  - 95 -
cases and again suggests an inverted U shape that is sloping downwards only at high levels of the 
mark-up. As was the case with the growth of labour productivity, if we re-estimate the 
specification in Column (3) excluding the country effects, and thus allowing cross-country 
variation to picked up by the results, the estimated relationship is significantly negative, and 
there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship.
63 Thus we again find a mainly positive 
relationship between the mark-up and productivity growth using only within-country variation, 
but a negative relationship when we include cross-country variation. The same discussion and 
caveats apply as were described above for the case of labour productivity. 
Table 18: Markup and growth of total factor productivity, aggregate business sector 
dependent variable: 
ln (growth of total factor 
productivity) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 

































      
      
No. of over-identifying restrictions 








      
Observations:  178 178 178 178 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are shown in column (3) of Table 9. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
                                                 
63 The coefficient on the mark-up in the linear case is –0.026 with a robust standard error of 0.011.  
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5.2.9  Manufacturing and services 
We now consider how the impact of product market reforms may differ between manufacturing 
(traded) and service (non-traded) sectors and how this is related to performance. In Table 19 we 
show the same regression as in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 9 but separately for manufacturing 
(ISIC 15-37) and services (ISIC 50-74), allowing the relationship to differ across the two sectors. 
Data constraints mean that we drop Portugal from the sample for manufacturing, and drop 
Portugal and Spain for services. The main differences from the aggregate results are: ease of 
starting a new business and time spent with government bureaucracy are related to the markup in 
services but not in manufacturing, and labour and credit market regulations have a greater impact 
in services than manufacturing. 
One surprising result is that the coefficient on mean tariff rate is high in services, which are 
generally not traded. This result seems to be driven mainly by Austria, and disappears if we drop 
Austria from the sample. This is not the case in manufacturing. One possibility is that Austria 
implemented other pro-competitive product market reforms in preparation for joining the EU that 
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Table 19: Product market reform and markup - manufacturing and service sectors 
Dependent  variable:  markup (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Sector: Manufacturing  Services 
        
















































        
























        
R squared  0.829  0.855  0.950  0.961 
Test of country effects  23.51 **  23.35 **  42.66 **  55.69 ** 
Observations:  159 114 143 105 
Countries:  11 11 10 10 
Years:  1985-2000 1990-2000 1985-2000 1990-2000 
        
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies.  
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
In Table 20 we relate the markup to the log level of employment as before, but now looking 
separately at the relationship in manufacturing and services. We see that increasing competition 
(lowering the markup) is associated with higher levels of employment, although this result is not 
significant after using instrumental variables in manufacturing. The impact in the service sector 
is similar to that seen in the aggregate.  
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Table 20: Employment in manufacturing and services 
Dependent variable: 
ln(employment) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sector:  M a n u f a c t u r i n g   Services 
   instrumental 
variables 
instrumental 




        

































Labour market regulation 





















Ease of starting a new 






Time with government 






Average tariff rate 
         -0.199 ** 
(0.053) 
        
        
No. of over-identifying 
restrictions    7 
 
4    7 
 
3 
Sargan test (p-value) 
    46.16 ** 
(0.000) 
6.58 




        
Observations:  159 159 159 143 143 143 
Countries:  11 11 11 10 10 10 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) are shown in Table 19. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
The Sargan tests of the over-identifying restrictions in column (2) and (5), where all eight policy 
indicators are excluded from the main employment regression, rejects these restrictions. By 
looking at the “residuals regression” we find three product market reforms which enter the 
employment equation in manufacturing – labour market regulations, the CEEP measure of public  
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enterprises and price controls. In the case of services four product market reforms enter – the 
CEEP measure of public enterprises, ease of starting a  new business, time with government 
bureaucracy and the average tariff rate. After these have been included the Sargan test does not 
reject the remaining over-identifying exclusion restrictions. 
As before, the main coefficient of interest is the one on the mark-up. This now changes 
substantially after including the reforms directly. In manufacturing the coefficient on the markup 
becomes insignificant. A move towards less restrictive labour market regulations and towards 
less public ownership of manufacturing capacity are associated with higher levels of 
employment, which accords with our expectations. Somewhat less intuitively, the direct effect of 
a relaxation of price controls is associated with reductions in employment. This does however 
accord with our findings above for the aggregate economy and for the markup in manufacturing - 
remember that relaxation of price controls were associated with an increase in the markup (i.e. 
higher prices) and this could lead to lower output and thus lower employment. 
In services a reduction in public enterprise and less time spent with government bureaucracy are 
associated with increased employment, while ease of starting a new business and lower tariffs 
are associated with less employment. But again, remember that these are only the partial effect, 
these product market reforms also entry through the markup. When we account for this we find 
that reductions in public enterprise have effectively no impact
64 and time spent with government 
bureaucracy is negatively associated.
65 Increasing the ease of entry overall has a positive 
association with employment,
66 as does the average tariff rate.
67 
In Table 21 we investigate the relationship with fixed capital formation and find that there is no 
significant impact in manufacturing but in services there is a very large impact – reductions in 
                                                 
64 The total effect of public enterprise is -0.005 = 0.0009 – 1.457*0.008. 
65 The total effect of time spent with government bureaucracy is -0.045 = 0.053 - 1.457*0.032. 
66 The total effect of ease of entry is 0.063 = 1.457*0.051 - 0.078. 
67 The total effect of the tariff rate is 0.114 = 1.457*0.176 - 0.199.  
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the mark-up are associated with increases in the level of gross fixed capital accumulation. This is 
the same relationship that we found in the aggregate economy, and is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions and empirical results contained in the paper by Alesina et al (2003) 
discussed earlier. 
In column (2) all of the instrumental variables (from Table 19) are excluded from the investment 
equation for manufacturing and the Sargan test clearly rejects this restriction. The “residuals 
regression” suggests that credit market regulations and price controls should enter the investment 
equation, as shown in column (3). As expected, and as we saw in the aggregate results, relaxing 
credit market regulations is associated with higher level of investment. Lower levels of price 
control are associated with lower investment, again, as we saw before this may be because lower 
price controls are associated with price rises and thus reductions in output. 
In column (5) all of the product market reforms are excluded from the investment equation and 
the Sargan test clearly rejects this restriction. The “residuals regression” suggests that three of 
the regulations should be included directly in the investment equation, as shown in column (6). 
The coefficient on the markup, our main variable of interest, remains effectively unchanged.  
The direct effect of increasing the ease of entry is negative – easier entry is associated with lower 
levels of investment. However, the indirect effect is positive and of about the same size 
(combining the negative coefficient of –0.051 in column (3) of Table 19 with the coefficient of   
–2.226 on the mark-up in column (6) of Table 21 gives a positive indirect effect of 0.11). 
The positive direct effect of the “average tariff rate” indicator suggests that lower average tariffs 
are associated with higher levels of investment. In this case the direct effect acts in the same 
direction as the indirect effect that acts through the level of rents. The “average tariff rate” has a 
significant negative coefficient of  -0.176 in Column (3) of Table 19, which combines with the 
estimated negative coefficient on the mark-up in Column (6) of Table 21 to give a positive 
indirect effect of the indicator on investment of 0.39, which, together with the direct effect gives 
a total effect of 0.56.   
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Reductions in regulatory trade barriers to not enter significantly in the markup equation so the 
direct positive effect is the total effect – reducing regulatory barriers to trade is associated with 
increases in investment in services. These results accord with the aggregate results and show that 
most of the impact on investment is coming through the service sector. 
Table 21: Fixed capital formation in manufacturing and services 
Dependent variable: 
ln(gross fixed capital 
formation) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sector:  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  Services 
   instrumental 
variables 
instrumental 




         
































Credit market regulation 







     -0.030 * 
(0.017)     
Ease of starting a new 






Average tariff rate 






Regulatory trade barriers 
         0.095 * 
(0.056) 
         
         
No. of over-identifying 
restrictions    7 
 
5    7 
 
4 
Sargan test (p-value) 
    13.88 * 
(0.053) 
7.99  




         
Observations:  159 159 159 143 143 143 
Countries:  11 11 11 10 10 10 
Years: 1985-2000  1985-2000  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies. Instruments in 
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) are shown in Table 19. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
In Tables 22 and 23 we look at R&D, allowing for non-linearities in all specifications as we saw 
above in the aggregate results that this was important. In the manufacturing sector (Table 22) we  
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find no statistically significant relationship between the markup and R&D investment after we 
use an instrumental variables estimator (column 2). The manufacturing sector results are, 
however, sensitive to the inclusion of Finland, where real R&D expenditure in manufacturing 
more than tripled between 1993 and 2000, largely because of one firm (Nokia).
68 In column (3) 
we drop Finland from the sample and the results show a strong inverted-U relationship. The 
predicted relationship between log R&D and the mark-up based on these coefficients is shown in 
Figure 30. The relationship is negative at levels of the mark-up above about 1.2, and Italy, 
France and the Netherlands are all mostly on the downwards sloping section. The Sargan test in 
column (3) rejects the over-identifying restrictions and the “residuals regression” suggests 
including ease of starting a new business, price controls and regulatory trade barriers. Ease of 
starting a new business is negatively associated with R&D expenditure (as it was with 
investment in physical capital). The indirect effect is in the opposite direction. Because of the 
non-linearity we have to evaluate the total effect at a specific level of the markup, we use the 
mean level. The indirect effects are very small relative to the direct effects (for three controls) so 
the direct effects dominate. 
                                                 
68 See Figure 11.  
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Table 22: R&D expenditure in manufacturing 
Dependent variable: 
ln(R&D) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 




      







































    







 -0.427  ** 
(0.102) 
      
      
No. of over-identifying 
restrictions 
 
  6 
 
6 3 
Sargan test (p-value) 






      
Observations:  93 93 79 79 
Countries:  8 8 7 7 
Years:  1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies.  
Instruments in columns (2), (3) and (4) are shown in column (x) of Table 19. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
In Table 23 we look at the relationship between the markup and R&D expenditure in the service 
sector. We find an inverted U relationship. In column (2) the Sargan test rejects the 
overidentifying restrictions and the “residuals regression” suggests including regulatory trade 
barriers, time with government bureaucracy and credit market regulations. Again the direct 
effects dominate. More lax regulatory trade barriers are associated with lower levels of R&D 
expenditure while less time with government bureaucracy and lower levels of credit market 
regulation are associated with higher levels of R&D expenditure.   
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Table 23: R&D expenditure in services 
Dependent variable: ln(gross fixed 
capital formation) 
(1) (2) (3) 
   instrumental  variables  instrumental  variables 
     
























Regulatory trade barriers 




Time with government bureaucracy 




Credit market regulation 
     0.398 ** 
(0.146) 
     
     
No. of over-identifying restrictions    6 
 
3 
Sargan test (p-value) 




     
Observations:  90 90 90 
Countries: 8  8  8 
Years:  1987-2000 1987-2000 1987-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regression include country and year dummies.  
Instruments in columns (2) and (4) are shown in column (x) of Table 19. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
The results for the levels and growth rates of labour productivity and TFP were generally similar 
to those in the aggregate economy, although the results for the growth rates appear to be driven 
mostly by the manufacturing sector. Due to the difficulties with these results discussed above the 
specific results for manufacturing and service sectors are not presented here.  
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6  Summary and conclusions 
In this study we have analysed the macro-economic impact of product market reforms 
undertaken in the European Union over the 1980s and 1990s. We considered a large number of 
regulations and reforms across EU countries. Our main methodology was a two-stage approach 
that highlighted the level of rents as a key determinant of factor demands and incentives for 
efficiency enhancement and innovation. We first estimated the relationship between product 
market reforms and the level of economic rents. We then estimated the relationship between the 
level of economic rents and aspects of macroeconomic performance, using our indicators of 
product market reform as instruments for the mark-up. We thus controlled for possible 
endogeneity of the mark-up due to shocks that affect rents and macroeconomic outcomes 
simultaneously.  
This method captures the impact of product market reforms on competition and the impact of 
competition on allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency – this includes the impact of 
competition on both innovation (as measured by R&D expenditure and total factor productivity) 
and of imitation (as measured by total factor productivity). It does not capture returns to scale. 
We showed that product market reforms that ease entry, reduce tariff rates and regulatory 
barriers to trade, remove price controls, and reduce public involvement in production affect the 
average level of economic rents in the economy in diverse ways. Reforms to labour and credit 
markets are associated with reductions in the level of economic rents available. Our empirical 
results showed that the level of economic rents is negatively associated with employment and 
investment, or in other words greater competition is associated with higher levels of employment 
and investment, particularly in the service sector. These results accord with theoretical 
predictions. Increases in competition bring prices closer to marginal costs, increasing output 
demanded and thus leading to increases in factor demands. 
We found that regulatory reforms that have reduced the level of economic rents appear to be 
associated with lower levels of labour and total factor productivity. In addition, while there 
appears to be a non-linear relationship between the level of economic rents and levels of R&D  
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expenditure and growth rates of labour and total factor productivity, most countries appear to 
have levels of economic rents where a reduction in rents is associated with a reduction in R&D 
and growth rates. These results are contrary to most of the existing empirical literature and there 
are a number of reasons why we would recommend caution in interpretation – some to do with 
possible measurement issues, others to do with timing and dynamics.  
First, this association is obtained from a within-groups estimator, so it is identified from 
differences in the relative time series variation within countries. When we look at the between, or 
cross-section, relationship we see that countries with lower levels of markups (higher levels of 
competition) have higher growth rates of productivity. The problem with the latter result is that 
we are not able to control for other differences across countries which may be correlated with 
product market regulations. For example, it might be that countries which had low levels of 
product market regulation were also countries that had better education systems, and this was 
associated with faster productivity growth.  
Secondly, there are many challenges in measuring the objects of interest (labour and total factor 
productivity as well as the degree of competition) correctly both within several sectors of the 
economy (particularly services) and also obtaining comparable measures across countries. The 
main problems are the correct measurement of prices to reflect both variation in firms’ market 
position and in the quality of the products produced, and are well recognised in the literature and 
by most national statistical agencies.
69 In addition, comparing the level of competition across 
countries is difficult due to differences in data collection and measurement. Some of these 
difficulties are lessened by looking at changes over time within countries, although this does not 
alleviate all the problems. 
Thirdly, it is also likely that dynamic processes are important here, and with the limited time 
series of data we have available to us we have not been able to fully investigate these. For 
                                                 
69 The US puts considerable effort into correcting prices indices, e.g. for computers. A discussion of the main issues 
is contained in an Appendix to this report, and see Griliches (1998) for further discussion  
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example, the literature emphasises the fact that adjustment costs in R&D are high (higher than 
for general employment or physical capital)
70 and it may take firms and others a long time to 
adjust to change. In addition, there are a number of difficulties in identifying the impact of such 
large scale reforms across heterogeneous countries which were experiencing different economic 
conditions.  
For many of the problems that we encounter micro data would help; micro data would allow us 
to model some of the dynamic processes, though here longer time series are what is really 
needed (and here the problem is not only data collection, but the extent and variability of reform 
across countries).  Micro data helps to deal with many aspects of heterogeneity, as well as many, 
though not all, of the measurement issues. Micro data is certainly needed to capture the 
complexity of mechanisms for regulating network industries. 
The very different experiences of different countries that we document raise the question of 
whether it is possible to impose a common structure across different countries. Essentially we 
should ask whether the experience of other EU countries is a suitable counterfactual for 
estimating the effects of changes in any particular country. An alternative strategy would be to 
look at firms or industries within a country that were affected by the reforms and compare their 
performance to those that were not affected, or to pick relevant groups of countries which share 
similar characteristics to act as controls. 
 
                                                 
70 See, inter alia, Hall (1993).  
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Appendix A: TFP 
We consider a production function of the form
71  
() it it it it it it it R M L K F A Y , , , =          ( 1 )  
where i indexes countries, t indexes time, Y is output, A is a Hicks-neutral productivity shift 
parameter (total factor productivity),  () . it F  can in principle vary across countries and over time, 
though in application we will have to restrict it in some dimensions,
72 K is a vector of capital 
inputs, L is vector of compensated labour inputs, M is a vector of intermediate inputs and R is 
knowledge inputs.  





































































=      (2) 
which says that the growth in output is equal to the growth in inputs weighted by the elasticity of 











= α  and similar for other inputs, plus the 
growth in TFP.  
The growth accounting literature
73 treats the growth in TFP as exogenous and views it as 
measuring technological change. In the endogenous growth literature the interpretation of the 
above equation imply a different interpretation of the growth accounting exercise. The precise 
                                                 
71 See, inter alia, the recent surveys by Hulten (2000), Griliches (1998) and Diewert and Nakumura (2000). 
72 This allows a very general functional form (e.g. it is consistent with a translog production function) and  it allows 
for factor augmenting technical progress as long as is common across all countries. 
73 Solow (1957)  
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interpretation depends on which variant of the growth model is considered, Barro (1998) 
provides an excellent and clear exposition of this.  
Empirically the main problem we face is that we do not observe these elasticities. There are two 
basic approaches to dealing with this problem. One is to estimate the production function 
econometrically. To do this we have to assume a functional form for  () . it F  and deal with the 
problem that inputs and output are determined simultaneously.
74 In the literature this is usually 
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.
75 This is a very restrictive functional form and implies constant 
factor shares. 
The alternative approach is to use economic theory to derive further restrictions which may 
enable us to measure some of the terms in (2) directly. For example, under the assumption that 
there is perfect competition in factor markets we know that factors are paid their marginal 
revenue product, and with perfect competition in the product market we know that marginal 
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where
Y
it p  is the price of output of the ith country at time t, and similar for others.  
















































s = = = = = = = = α α α α , , ,  
                                                 
74 See Griliches and Mairresse (1985) for an excellent explanation of the many problems encountered. 
75 Some papers estimate a translog, see inter alia Nadiri, Bernstein.   
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which is generally observed (except for capital). Assuming that there are constant returns to scale 
an expression for the growth rate of output can be obtained using the approximation 












it it a r s m s l s y ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ = ∆         ( 4 )  
where  ∆  denotes log difference and lower case variables are logged and scaled by capital, i.e. 
() () 1 1 ln ln − − − = ∆ it it it it it K Y K Y y . This is Caves et al (1982) superlative index. It allows us to 
measure the growth in output as a function of growth in factor shares and factor accumulation, 
plus the growth in TFP.
76  
This is the basically the approach taken in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and many other 
empirical papers. Many papers have discuss the problems with this approach and in particular, 
the assumption of perfect competition in the product market and constant returns to scale are 
problematic when it is exactly those effects that we are looking for. 
With imperfect competition in the product market, i.e. where price is marked up above marginal 
cost, then marginal revenue is no longer equal to price but instead can be written 
Y
it it it p MR µ =  
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76 This index has many nice properties like in multilateral comparisons it is transitive.  
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In this case the growth in output becomes,
77 






it it it a r s l s m s y ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ = ∆ µ .       (6) 
Thus in the presence of imperfect competition the Caves et al (1982) index will give biased 






it it r s m s l s ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ − − 1 µ .  
 
                                                 
77 See Hall (1988) and Klette (1999).  
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Appendix B: Data availability 
Our main data source for economic performance is the OECD STAN database. Table 24 shows 
the availability of data on value-added and employment across countries at different levels of 
aggregation over the period 1985 – 2000.  
Table 24: Availability of value-added and employment, 1985-2000 












        
Austria  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Belgium  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Denmark  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Finland  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
France   Y Y Y  (91  -  )  Y Y 
Germany  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - ) 
Greece  (95 - )  (95 - )  (95 - )  (95 - )  (95 - )  (95 - ) 
(Ireland)  - - - - - - 
Italy  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Luxembourg  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Netherlands  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Portugal  Y Y Y Y Y  (  -  95) 
Spain  Y Y Y  (95  -  )  Y Y 
Sweden  Y  Y  (93 - )  (93 - )  Y  (93 - ) 
UK  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
USA  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Table 25 shows that information on investment, and on other variables constructed using 
investment such as TFP, is less frequently available. This limits the sample of countries we are 
able to consider for these variables. In particular, Germany and Greece have shorter time series 
and Luxembourg and Spain have insufficient investment data.  
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Table 25: Availability of investment, mark-ups and TFP, 1985-2000 












        
Austria  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Belgium  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Denmark  Y  (93 - )  (93 - )  (93 - )  (93 - )  (93 - ) 
Finland  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
France   Y Y Y (92  -  )  Y Y 
Germany  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - )  (91 - ) 
Greece  (95 - )  (95 - )  -  (95 - )  (95 - )  - 
(Ireland)  - - - - - - 
Italy  Y Y -  Y Y - 
Luxembourg  - - - - - - 
Netherlands  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Portugal  (88 - )  (95 – 97)  -  (95 – 97)  (95 – 97)  - 
Spain  Y  (Y)*  -  (95 - )  (93 - )  - 
Sweden  Y  Y  (93 - )  (93 - )  Y  (93 - ) 
UK  Y  Y  (89 - )  Y  Y  (92 - ) 
USA  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Appendix C: Further econometric results 
Eurostat structural indicators 
In Table 26 we introduce three Eurostat structural indicators the regression relating the markup 
to product market reforms for the aggregate economy, manufacturing and business sector 
services. The Eurostat data is only available over a shorter time period, restricted to 1993-2000, 
resulting in significantly smaller sample sizes than above. For each sector we first present the 
results on only the group of indicators used above in order to show the effect of changing the 
sample, and then introduce the Eurostat indicators. The Eurostat indicators are only available for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1995 onwards, and so there is no differential variation in the 
index of the average tariff rate, which is excluded from the regressions as a result. The indicators 
used above are all coded to be increasing in “economic freedom” as above, while the Eurostat 
indicators are the original data. 
In this smaller sample, the results on the basic specification in columns (1), (3) and (5) are 
generally less informative than in the full-sample results shown above. For example, the 
coefficient on “ease of starting a new business” has become insignificant in the aggregate 
economy and business sector services, and is weakly positive in manufacturing. The coefficients 
on the CEEP measure of public enterprises and the labour and credit market regulation indices 
are similar to before. 
None of the Eurostat indicators enter significantly in the aggregate economy in column (2). In 
manufacturing (column 4) the coefficient on “public procurement as a % of GDP” is negative 
and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that a reduction in public procurement of 1% of GDP 
is associated on average with a 1 percentage point increase in the mark-up in manufacturing. 
This could be consistent with the government having a degree of buyer power that enables it to 
keep prices down. In business sector services (column 6) “state aids as a % of GDP” is negative 
and significant at the 1% level, and “openly advertised public procurement as a % of total public 
procurement” is positive and significant at the 10% level. A reduction in state aids of 1% of GDP  
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is associated with about a 5 percentage point increase in the mark-up in business sector services. 
Given that the average mark-up in the service sector sample is 0.41 this corresponds to about a 
12 % reduction in the mark-up. Few countries experienced reductions in state aids of this 
magnitude over the sample period, apart from Germany where state aids fell from 2.12% of GDP 
in 1993 to 0.82% in 2000. 
Table 26: Relationship between indicators of product market reform and markup, 
including Eurostat structural indicators 
Dependent variable: markup  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Sector: Aggregate  economy  Manufacturing  Services 
            
























Average tariff rate  -  -  -  -  -  - 








































            




































            




 -0.049  ** 
(0.017) 








Openly advertised public 






 0.004  * 
(0.002) 
            
Observations: 82  82  75  75  71  71 
Countries: 12  12  11  11  10  10 
Years: 1993-2000  1993-2000  1993-2000  1993-2000  1993-2000  1993-2000 
            
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies.  
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
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Robustness in aggregate economy 
In this section we present results from regressions of our main macroeconomic outcomes directly 
on all of our indicators of product market reform for the aggregate economy.
78 These results 
serve as a test of robustness of our two-stage instrumental variables results presented above. A 
limitation of this direct approach is that we are not able to capture possible non-linearities at 
different levels of the mark-up, which are often suggested by theory and are supported by our 
results.  
Results from regressing the product market and other reforms directly on outcomes for the 
aggregate economy are shown in Table 27. All regressions include country and year dummies as 
before, as well as a measure of the output gap to control for country-specific cycles. The reform 
indicators are the same as in column (3) of Table 9, with all indicators coded so that they are 
increasing in “economic freedom”, or equivalently decreasing in the strictness of regulation.  
We start with employment in column (1) and investment in column (2) of Table 27. All the 
significant coefficients have the expected sign and are roughly the expected size according to the 
logic described above. The index of the average tariff rate has a positive and significant 
coefficient, as do the indices of labour and credit market regulation, while the index of price 
controls has a negative and significant coefficient. In earlier sections we found a negative 
relationship between the mark-up and the levels of employment and gross fixed capital 
formation. If the results for employment and gross fixed capital formation in this section are 
consistent with our two-stage results we thus expect the sign of the coefficients on the reform 
indicators to be the opposite to that found in our first-stage results in earlier sections.  
In our two stage results discussed earlier we found that “ease of starting a new business” entered 
both directly into the employment equation, and indirectly through the markup, and that these 
                                                 
78 Equivalent results for manufacturing and service sectors are presented in Appendix C  
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two effects almost exactly cancelled out. In column (1) of Table 27 we see that the coefficient on 
ease of entry is insignificant, in line with our earlier results. Another example is the coefficient 
on the average tariff rate. At the aggregate level we found in column (3) of Table 9 that the index 
of the average tariff rate had a negative and significant coefficient in the first-stage mark-up 
regression. In other words a higher value of the index (a lower average tariff rate) was associated 
with a lower mark-up. Combining this with the negative relationship between the mark-up and 
the level of employment in the second stage we would expect that in a direct regression of the 
level of employment on our reform indicators the coefficient on the index of the average tariff 
rate would be positive. In other words a higher value of the index (a lower average tariff rate) 
should be associated with a higher level of employment. In addition, the coefficient should be of 
the same order of magnitude as the equivalent coefficient in column (3) of Table 9, given that the 
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Table 27: Direct regressions, aggregate economy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependant variable:  ln(empl)  ln(gfcf)  ln(labour 
prod) 
growth in 
lab prod  ln(TFP)  growth in 
TFP  ln(R&D) 
         


























































































         










































         
Observations:  181 181 181 180 181 178 100 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 12 12  8 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1987-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
The results for gross fixed capital formation in column (2) are also consistent with our two-stage 
results. In particular, the coefficient on the index of the average tariff rate is large and 
significantly positive, as is that on the index of credit market regulation, which might be  
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expected to be especially relevant to investment behaviour. Thus lower average tariffs and less 
restrictive credit market regulation are both associated with higher levels of investment. 
The significant coefficients for the level and growth rates of labour productivity and TFP in 
columns (3) – (6) and on R&D in column (7) also go in the expected direction based on our two-
stage results. Overall these results support the main findings from our two-stage approach, as do 
those for the manufacturing and service sectors, which are presented in Appendix C.   
Robustness in manufacturing and service sectors 
In this section we present results from regressions of our main macroeconomic outcomes on our 
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Table 28: Manufacturing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependant variable:  ln(empl)  ln(gfcf)  ln(labour 
prod) 
growth in 
lab prod  ln(TFP)  growth in 
TFP  ln(R&D) 
         


























































































         










































         
Observations:  159 159 159 158 159 157  93 
Countries:  11 11 11 11 11 11  8 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1987-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
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Table 29: Services 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependant variable:  ln(empl)  ln(gfcf)  ln(labour 
prod) 
growth in 
lab prod  ln(TFP)  growth in 
TFP  ln(R&D) 
         


























































































         










































         
Observations:  143 143 143 141 143 140  90 
Countries:  10 10 10 10 10 10  8 
Years:  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1987-2000 
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
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Appendix D: Network industries 
The network industries are where we have seen some of the most significant changes in 
ownership and regulation. There is a large and growing literature on the micro econometric 
analysis of regulated industries as discussed above. This literature emphasizes the fact that the 
details of the type of competitive and regulatory regime into which an industry is liberalised 
matters a lot and often in very subtle ways. We are not able to capture most of these subtleties 
with the data available to us. To investigate these issues properly micro data on both 
performance and regulations is needed. Here we can only capture the impact of major events 
such as privatization and liberalisation. We first consider the electricity, gas and water industry 
and then the telecommunications and post industry. We then go on to consider the aggregate 
economy and manufacturing and service sectors. 
In the network industries it is particularly difficult to measure profit margins, our estimate of the 
mark-up depends on the assumption that marginal and average costs are approximately equal, 
which is particularly not true in network industries, which have high fixed costs. In these 
industries we consider the direct effect of regulatory changes on macroeconomic outcomes.  
D.1 Electricity, gas and water 
The performance data we have from STAN data is available for the “Electricity, Gas and Water 
Supply” industries combined (ISIC 40-41). We therefore consider regulation in these three 
industries together. 
D.1.1 Electricity deregulation 
In Europe deregulation of the electricity industry started in the UK in 1989. In 1996 the EU 
adopted a Directive for the Internal Market for Electricity (EU Directive 96/92/EC). The 
Directive marks the first major legislative step toward the creation of an open and competitive 
European electricity market. Under this law, all Member States were required to open at least  
  - 128 -
25.37% of their electricity markets to competition as of February 1999. This represents the 
overall share of electricity supply used by consumers larger than 40GWh. 
In respect to generation, the directive allows individual countries to choose between alternative 
systems of tendering or licensing for new capacity. Under the tendering system, a Member State 
issues a tender for new capacity, which enables it to keep overall control of the amount of 
capacity coming onto the system? Under the licensing system, individual tenders are not issued 
but generic criteria are set by the member state, for example covering land use, fuel mix and 
environmental issues. 
By February 2000 the market opening requirement had risen to 30%. By February 2003 the 
Directive requires the majority of industrial and commercial customers to have a choice of 
supplier creating one single European Energy Market with a combined value of over £50 billion, 
moving the required level of market opening to 35%. The degree of market opening in 2002 
ranged from 30% to 100% and the total market across Europe was estimated to be 80% open. 
We have information on the degree of public ownership in the electricity industry from 1986 to 
1998 on a scale of one to five, where one corresponds to entirely public, two to mostly public, 
three to mixed, four to mostly private and five to private. This variable is shown in Figure 29.
79  
                                                 
79 Data is currently not available for Austria.  
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Figure 29: Electricity ownership (1-public, 2-mostly public, 3-mixed, 4-mostly private, 5-private). 
Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
The UK and Portugal are the only countries where this varies over time. The UK goes from 
public ownership to private ownership over the period. Portugal switches from public to mostly 
public. In all other countries the state of ownership remains the same over the period, and thus 
can not be identified from other country or industry characteristics. 
The econometric results for these variables are thus driven entirely by the two changes in 
ownership in the UK and the single change in Portugal, with performance in other EU countries 
acting as the counterfactual. That is, the other EU countries represent what we think would have 
happened in the UK and Portugal if the UK and Portugal had not privatised electricity. There are 
a number of reasons to believe that the performance of the UK electricity might have differed 
from other EU countries even if privatisation had not occurred. For example the industry in the 
UK was perceived to have suffered from long-term under-investment. The history of  
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privatisation in the UK means that we may not believe these results hold general relevance for 
other EU countries. That is, we may not believe that if the other countries enacted the same 
reforms at the UK they would necessarily experience the same changes in performance. 
The other product market reform indicators that we use for the electricity industry include an 
indicator that relates to liberalisation of the industry. This is equal to zero in every year that the 
country reported that the industry was not liberalised, and one in every year that it reported that 
the industry was liberalised.
80 Again, since our regressions control for country specific 
characteristics that are not observed, the effect of liberalisation is only identified off changes 
over time within countries. Countries that show no time-series variation in a variable act as 
controls, that is they represent what would have happened if liberalisation had not occurred. 
A number of countries liberalised their electricity industries over the 1986-1998 period 
(Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK), as shown in Figure 30. However, in two of 
these cases (Denmark and Germany) we only observe one year of data after liberalisation and in 
Sweden we only observe two years. This means that in practice the identification is coming off a 
very small number of observations. This is worrying and should lead us to treat any results with 
caution – their applicability to other circumstances may be limited. 
                                                 
80 The OECD data for Denmark appeared to conflict with other available information on liberalisation of electricity 
markets. For this reason we have changed the liberalisation indicator to switch from zero to one in 1998 rather than 
1996, which is the year indicated by the OECD. Data for other countries appeared to correspond well with other 
information sources.  
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Figure 30: electricity liberalisation. Source: OECD International Regulation Database 
 
We also use an indicator that relates to consumers’ choice of suppliers. This is equal to zero in 
each year that the country reported that there was no choice of suppliers and one if it reported 
that there was some choice. A number of countries introduced choice of suppliers over the 
sample period (Finland, Germany, Portugal, Sweden and the UK), as shown in Figure 31. 
However, we see that many countries introduced this reform at the same time as liberalisation 
(Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK) so the impact of these two reforms can not be 
separately identified from data on these countries. This point is clearer in Figure 32 where the 
timing of all the electricity reforms is shown together. We can see that in Denmark, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK all reforms happen at the same time. In Finland, Germany and Sweden there is 
a one year gap between liberalisation and subsequent reforms.  
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Figure 31: Electricity: Consumer choice of suppliers. Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
Another of the indicators of the nature of reform in electricity relates to the presence of third 
party access. This is equal to zero in each year that the country reported no third party access, 
and one in each year that the country reported either negotiated or regulated third party access. 
Denmark, Finland, Spain, Sweden and the UK introduced third party access during the sample 
period, as shown in Figure 32.  
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Figure 32: Electricity: third party access. Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
The final indicator that we use relates to the existence of a wholesale pool. This is equal to zero 
in each year that the country reported that there was not a wholesale pool, and one in each year 
that the country reported that there was. Finland, Sweden and the UK introduced a wholesale 
pool during the sample period, as shown in Figure 33. In Finland this took place the year after 
the other liberalisations, while in Sweden and the UK they happened at the same time.  
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Figure 33: Electricity: wholesale pool. Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
The timing of these reforms was similar in many countries, as shown in Figure 34. While there 
are sufficient differences for us to identify each of the variables in the regressions below the 
results are often being identified off single events. Again, this is a concern if we are interested in 
using these estimates to consider what the impact of similar reforms might be in other countries – 
it is not clear how general these results are.  
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Figure 34: Electricity indicators. Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
D.1.2 Gas 
Deregulation of the gas industry in Europe started in 1986 in the UK, when the market was 
opened for non-domestic customers and British Gas, the largest integrated gas utility company in 
the world, was privatised. Unlike electricity, liberalisation of the gas sector has progressed 
slowly in the EU. The EU Gas Directive was issued in 1998.  
The gas directive permits member states to choose either regulated third party access to their gas 
grid, negotiated access or a combination of both. Eight countries chose regulated third party 
access. The directive also adopted a three-level phased opening of the EU gas market, with an 
absolute minimum level of opening of 20%, or all customers above a certain size. Compliance 
varies from country to country. By 2002 the degree of market opening ranged from 20% to 
100%.   
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The US began deregulation of the gas markets in 1978. Over half the states in the US now have 
residential restructuring programmes. Despite recent gas price increases in the US, the long term 
trend of prices in the US has been down since 1980. In the UK, the only other country with a 
comparable history of deregulation of the gas markets, average industrial prices for gas have 
fallen by 43% in real terms since 1990 and domestic prices by 23%. 
Since the changes in the regulation of gas markets have taken place either at the very beginning 
or after the end of our available sample period, we are not able to identify their effects separately 
from other unobservable differences across countries. For example, the effects of deregulation in 
the UK will be picked up by the UK country dummy, along with other constant unobservable 
characteristics of the UK gas market. 
D.1.3 Water 
There has been relatively little change in the water industry except in the UK where it was 
privatized in 1989. The new EU water law encourages the use of economic instruments to 
achieve environmental objectives.  
D.1.4 Impact of reforms on performance in Electricity, Water and Gas 
Table 30 presents estimates of the relationship between reforms and the log level of employment 
in the Electricity, Water and Gas sector, for the 11 EU countries where data is available for the 
1986-1998 period. The first column includes the ownership indicators. These have been coded 
into three variables, all of which are time-varying zero/one dummies. “Ownership: mostly 
public” is equal to zero in any year when the country reports public ownership (a value of one in 
the original data), and one if the country reports ownership that is mostly public, mixed, mostly 
private or private (values two to five). “Ownership: mostly private” and “Ownership: private” are 
constructed in a similar way. Referring back to Figure 29 above, these three variables are picking 
up the effects of the three observed changes: Portugal switching from public to mostly public in 
1989, the UK switching from public to mostly private in 1989 (captured by the sum of mostly 
public and mostly private), and the UK switching from mostly private to private in 1995.   
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The results suggest that all three events were associated with reductions in employment, with the 
last of the three having the largest effect (this is the marginal effect of a change in the UK from 
“mostly private” to “private”). The reform in Portugal was associated with a 5.5% reduction in 
employment, the first UK reform with a reduction of 12.9% and the second UK reform with a 
reduction of 30%. As emphasised above, the identification of these effects is coming off of 
single regulatory changes. This means that we should be very careful about using these to infer 
the likely effects of similar changes in other countries.  
Table 30: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply: Employment 
Dependent variable:  
ln (employment) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         
Ownership: mostly public  -0.055 ** 
(0.024) 
      -0.051  ** 
(0.026) 
Ownership: mostly private  -0.074 ** 
(0.032) 
      - 0 . 0 0 6  
(0.047) 
Ownership: private  -0.297 ** 
(0.044) 
      -0.314  ** 
(0.048) 
Liberalisation   -0.095  ** 
(0.033) 




Consumer choice of suppliers      -0.117 ** 
(0.030) 
















         
         
Observations:  137 137 137 137 137 137 137 















         
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
In columns (2) to (5) we look separately at the impact of liberalisation, consumer choice of 
suppliers, third party access and the existence of a wholesale pool. All four enter significantly  
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and with a negative impact – reforms that open the electricity market up to competition lead to a 
reduction in employment within the electricity industry.  
In column (6) we include all four indicators together. As we saw above, these reforms happened 
at much the same time, so identifying the impact of each separately is difficult. However, it 
seems that “Consumer choice of suppliers” dominates as it maintains a significant negative effect 
once we have conditioned on the other variables. Column (7) brings back the ownership 
variables. Only the result on “Ownership: mostly private” is significantly changed. Overall, then, 
the results suggest that the transfer of ownership from public to private, and the introduction of 
consumer choice of suppliers, are associated with reductions in employment within the 
electricity industry. The magnitude of these effects is economically significant and in fact quite 
large (similar to the results found in Alesina at al (2003)). The results in column (7) suggest that 
moving from public to mostly public ownership (as Portugal did in 1988) was associated with 
5.1% reduction in employment, that moving to full private ownership (from mostly private, as 
the UK did in 1996) was associated with a 31.5% reduction in employment and that the 
introduction of consumer choice of suppliers was associated on average with a reduction in 
employment levels of about 12%.  
We now consider the effects of regulatory reforms on the level of labour productivity to examine 
whether reductions in employment have been part of an increase in productive efficiency. Table 
31 presents the results for the level of labour productivity, as measured by value added per 
worker. In column (1) “Ownership: mostly public” has a significant positive effect, as does 
“Ownership: private”. As above these can be interpreted as the effects of specific events in 
Portugal and the UK respectively. “Consumer choice of suppliers” is the only other variable to 
have a significant effect, remaining positive in columns (6) and (7) when the other variables are 
also included. Interestingly, the coefficient on “Consumer choice of suppliers” in columns (6) 
and (7) is very similar to that in the employment results in Table 30, suggesting that increases in 
labour productivity were achieved largely through a reduction in the number of employees rather 
than through an expansion of output. Overall these results accord well with theory: the  
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movement towards greater competition was associated with an increase in the level of productive 
efficiency, through labour shedding.  
Table 31: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply: level of labour productivity 
Dependent variable:  
ln (value added per worker) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         
Ownership: mostly public  0.184 ** 
(0.041) 
      0.169  ** 
(0.041) 
Ownership: mostly private  -0.040 
(0.051) 
      -0.08 
(0.085) 
Ownership: private  0.309 ** 
(0.054) 
      0.311  ** 
(0.054) 
Liberalisation   0.061 
(0.045) 




Consumer choice of suppliers      0.085 * 
(0.044) 
















         
         
Observations:  137 137 137 137 137 137 137 















         
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
Surprisingly, we found no significant results using the growth of labour productivity. There are 
several possible explanations for this. One is that deregulation and the transfer of ownership 
were associated with one-off changes in the level of productive efficiency, without creating any 
increase in longer-term dynamic efficiency. Dynamic effects may be particularly important  
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here.
81  However, our sample period is short and we are probably not able to pick up these latter 
effects. 
Next we consider the relationship between reforms and gross fixed capital formation and the 
level of TFP. STAN data on gross fixed capital formation in the Electricity, Gas and Water 
Supply industry (and thus for TFP, which is constructed using an estimated capital stock), has 
slightly more limited coverage than the output and employment data we have been using so far. 
In particular it is necessary to drop Portugal from the sample, leaving 110 observations on 10 
countries over the 1986-1998 period. This also means that we can not include “Ownership: 
mostly public” because this was only identified off the one reform in Portugal. 
In Table 32 the first column suggests that the shift from public to “mostly private” ownership in 
the UK was associated with a large (about 30%) increase in the level of gross fixed capital 
formation. When the other indicators are included on their own in columns (2) to (5) we find no 
significant results. However, when they are all included in column (6), so that the marginal effect 
of each conditional on the others can be picked up, all four become significant. Liberalisation 
and the existence of a wholesale pool appear to have had a positive effect, while consumers’ 
choice of suppliers and third party access appear to have had a negative effect. However, once 
we also control for ownership changes in the UK in column (7), the result on the existence of a 
wholesale pool disappears. 
These results appear puzzling, but suggest that while liberalisation has been associated with 
increases in gross fixed capital formation, other pro-competitive changes such as the introduction 
of consumer choice of suppliers and third party access have been associated with reductions. 
However, as emphasized above, these are being identified in most cases off of single events and 
a more thorough investigation would use micro data to look within each country and the impact 
that these events were having. 
                                                 
81 See, for example, Alesina et al (2003) and Bond and Van Reenen (1999).  
  - 141 -
Table 32: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply: gross fixed capital formation 
Dependent variable:  
ln (value added per worker) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         
Ownership: mostly public  -            - 
Ownership: mostly private  0.336 ** 
(0.071) 
      0.528  ** 
(0.099) 
Ownership: private  -0.092 
(0.75) 
      -0.137  * 
(0.080) 
Liberalisation   0.018 
(0.061) 




Consumer choice of suppliers      0.003 
(0.064) 




Third  party  access      -0.084 
(0.068) 










         
         
Observations:  110 110 110 110 110 110 110 















         
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
Table 33 presents the relationship between reforms and the level of TFP. Overall they are very 
similar to those for the level of labour productivity in Table 31. Column (1) suggests that the 
shift from mostly private to private ownership in the UK was associated with an increase in the 
level of TFP.
82 Columns (6) and (7) suggest that the introduction of consumer choice of suppliers 
has also been associated with a higher level of TFP. As was the case with labour productivity, we 
did not find any significant results using the growth of TFP. 
                                                 
82 As with gross fixed capital formation, the coefficient on “Ownership: mostly public” cannot be identified because 
data for Portugal is not available.  
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Table 33: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply: level of TFP 
Dependent variable:  
ln (value added per worker) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         
Ownership: mostly public  -            - 
Ownership: mostly private  0.000 
(0.024) 
      -0.048 
(0.046) 
Ownership: private  0.080 ** 
(0.021) 
      0.091  ** 
(0.023) 
Liberalisation   0.031 
(0.023) 




Consumer choice of suppliers      0.038 
(0.024) 
















         
         
Observations:  110 110 110 110 110 110 110 















         
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
Finally, we considered the impact that regulatory reforms had on price levels. We have data from 
Eurostat on electricity prices (in Euros) for industrial and household users over the shorter time 
period of 1994-2002. The overlap between this data and the OECD data on regulatory changes 
gives a five year time-period of 1994-1998, with some countries only starting in 1995. The 
ownership variables do not have sufficient variation over this period to be included. We include 
these results because of the Commission’s specific interest in them, the sample sizes are small. 
Tables 34 and 35 show the results of regressing log prices for industrial and household users 
respectively on the reform indicators, including country and year dummies as before. Third party 
access has a consistently significant positive effect on prices in both tables, but we should treat  
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this result with caution since the only observed change in this variable during the short sample 
period was in Denmark in 1998, at the very end of the period. Once again, this emphasizes the 
difficulties in interpreting results from small samples where there is only a small amount of 
differential change across countries.  
Table 34: Electricity: prices for industrial users 
Dependent variable: ln (prices)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5) 
       
Liberalisation 0.069 
(0.079) 
    0.013 
(0.035) 
Consumer choice of suppliers    -0.069 * 
(0.036) 
   -0.057 
(0.041) 
Third party access      0.177 ** 
(0.036) 
 0.152  ** 
(0.054) 




       
Observations:  51 51 51 51 51 
Countries:  11 11 11 11 11 
Years:  1994-1998 1994-1998 1994-1998 1994-1998 1994-1998 
       
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
The only other significant result is in column (2) of Table 34, where consumer choice of 
suppliers has a negative effect on industrial prices, corresponding to a reduction of about 7%. 
This is picking up the effect of changes in Germany and Portugal. However, the coefficient 
becomes insignificant in column (5) once all the other variables are also included. In order to 
gain a proper understanding of the impact that reforms in this industry has had on prices it would 
be essential to using more recent and more disaggregated data on electricity prices and on the 
relevant regulatory reforms. 
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Table 35: Electricity: prices for household users 
Dependent variable: ln (prices)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5) 
       
Liberalisation 0.026 
(0.039) 
    -0.015 
(0.013) 
Consumer choice of suppliers    -0.022 
(0.025) 
   -0.004 
(0.027) 
Third party access      0.074 ** 
(0.021) 
 0.088  ** 
(0.031) 




       
Observations:  50 50 50 50 50 
Countries:  11 11 11 11 11 
Years:  1994-1998 1994-1998 1994-1998 1994-1998 1994-1998 
       
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
D.2 Telecommunications and postal services 
We now turn to a consideration of the telecommunications and postal services sectors. Our data 
for the dependent variables is from the OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis and 
corresponds to the “Post and Telecoms” sector (ISIC 64). Data on regulatory reforms is from the 
OECD International Regulatory Database which contains time-varying information from 1985 to 
1997. 
D.2.1 Telecommunications deregulation 
Deregulation in the telecommunications industry has a longer history. The first phase of 
Community policy in this area was initiated in 1984. The most important aspects of this early 
phase were the development of standards, common research and special development 
programmes for the least developed regions of the European Union. A second phase of 
Community policy was initiated in 1987 with the publication of a Green Paper on the 
development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment. The  
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Commission proposed the introduction of more competition in the telecommunications market 
combined with a higher degree of harmonisation. The Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty on 
European Union in 1993 extended the legal basis for European integration in the area of 
telecommunications by means of a Treaty chapter on Trans-European networks. 
As of January 1998 telecommunications services were on paper fully liberalized in most EU 
countries. The Commission presented a draft for a new regulatory framework in July 2000. In 
2002, the EU adopted the new regulatory framework for electronic communications.  The 
framework includes five draft Directives and a Regulation that would make up the new 
regulatory framework for electronic communications infrastructure and associated services. The 
main trend is towards less detailed ex ante regulation, for operators without market dominance, 
and more ex post checks. A main reason to propose the framework was to simplify the relevant 
legislation, bringing the number of Directives from some thirty to just five. The main change in 
the framework is no longer making a difference between fixed and mobile telephones, but 
between dominant and non-dominant players.   
We have data on liberalisation and privatisation for all countries in our sample, and for three 
segments of the telecommunications market: basic voice trunk (BVT), referring to domestic 
long-distance fixed telephony, international long-distance fixed telephony (basic voice 
international, BVI) and cellular mobile telephony. 
To measure the extent of public ownership and privatisation we use data from the OECD 
International Regulatory Database on the state shareholding in the PTO. Privatisation happened 
to different degrees across countries and over time. To allow for this, and the possibility that 
different degrees of privatisation may have differential effects, we use three indicators. The first 
refers to “partial” privatization and is equal to zero if the state shareholding is 100% and one if 
the share is less than 100%. The second refers to privatization that enables private “control”, and 
is equal to one only if the state shareholding is less than 50%. Finally a “full” privatization 
variable is equal to one only if the state shareholding is zero. Figure 35 shows this data as a step  
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function, where the three indicators have been added together. It is clear that there is a fair 
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Figure 35: Telecommunications privatisation (0: state share is 100%, 1: state share 50-99%, 2: state share 1-50%, 
3: state share is 0). Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD International Regulation Database. 
We also have data on the year of liberalization for the three market segments mentioned above. 
There is little variation between the year of liberalization for the basic voice trunk and basic 
voice international segments, with only Sweden liberalizing the two in different years. We define 
a single indicator which is equal to one whenever either segment is liberalized. We treat the 
liberalization of the mobile segment as a separate variable. These are shown in Figure 36, where 
we can see that mobile phone liberalization is much more common, happened in different years 
and happened before basic voice.  
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Figure 36: Telecommunications liberalisation indicators. 
 Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
We also have data on the market share of new entrants in the basic voice and basic voice 
international segments for the 1984-1998 period. While this data does not represent the 
exogenous policy environment in the same way as our other data, it does provide some indication 
of the effectiveness of liberalization in a way that a simple zero/one dummy cannot. Figure 37 
shows the liberalisation indicator and the market share of new entrants together.
83 It is clear that 
market shares begin to rise soon after liberalization, and may provide a better indicator of the 
extent to which liberalisation has been effective. Again, the market shares of new entrants in the 
two segments are highly collinear. For this reason we use the market share data for the trunk 
segment in our econometric analysis, but the results are very similar if we use the international 
segment, or include both and test for joint significance. 
                                                 
83 The liberalisation indicator has been rescaled so that it goes to 100 instead of 1 when the industry is liberalised.  
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Figure 37: Telecommunications liberalisation (basic voice) and market shares of new entrants. 
 Source: OECD International Regulation Database. 
D.2.2 Postal services deregulation 
The post services are included in the same industry classification as telecommunications. There 
has been much less deregulation in postal services. The Postal Directive 97/67/EC establishes a 
clear maximum scope for the reserved area (this is currently 350 grams if less than 5 times 1st 
class tariff) but only  to the extent necessary to maintain universal service. There was an 
obligation on the Member States to implement by February 1999. However, implementation has 
been uneven across Member States. 
In October 2001 15 EU Member States agreed a compromise to lower the reserved area limits 
and open up more of the postal market to competition by 2006. This will result in between 25% 
and 40% of the market being open for competition. Cross-Border and direct mail will be 
completely open for competition from 2003 in most cases.  In 2006, the European Commission  
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will review the impact of gradual liberalization on Universal Service Obligations before any 
decision on full liberalisation is taken. This could lead to full market opening by 2009. 
D.2.3 Impact of reforms on performance in telecommunications and postal services 
Table 36 shows the relationship between reforms in telecommunications and employment for 12 
countries over the 1985-1997 period. We do not include the “Privatisation: full” dummy because 
full privatization only ever occurs in 1997 which is the last year in our sample (see Figure 37). 
There is a significant negative effect of partial privatization on employment (about a 4% 
reduction) in column (1), but this becomes insignificant in column (2) once we include the 
indicator for “control” privatization, which is also insignificant. These results suggest that there 
is a significant reduction in employment when we compare any privatisation at all to no 
privatisation in column (1), but that we do not detect a significant reduction in employment 
associated with either the shift from no privatisation to partial privatisation, or from partial 
privatisation to “control” privatisation in column (2). However, the hypothesis that the sum of 
the two coefficients in column (2) is equal to zero is rejected at the 5% level, indicating that 
“control” privatisation is associated with a significantly lower level of employment when 
compared to no privatisation.
84 
                                                 
84 This is not true when we impose a more restrictive functional form, e.g. imposing that the impact of partial is the 
same as control (which is what we do if we put in a variable that equals 1 for partial and 2 for control), or if we 
include a single dummy indicating either one.  
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Table 36: Telecommunications and postal, Employment 
Dependent variable: 
ln (employment) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         






   -0.053  * 
(0.027) 




   -0.013 
(0.028) 
















Market share of new entrants 
(trunk) 






         
Test that sum of privatisation 
coefficients is equal to zero 
(p-value) 




   5.48  ** 
(0.021) 
         
Observations:  138 138 138 138 138 138 138 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 
         
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
In column (3) we see that the indicators for basic voice and mobile liberalisation on their own are 
not significant, although they are jointly significant at the 10% level. In column (4) where we 
include both privatisation and liberalisation indicators we see that basic voice liberalisation 
becomes negative and significant at the 10% level.
85 In column (5) we include a measure of the 
market share of new entrants. This is significant and negative – more competition, as captured by 
the increase in the market share of entrants, is associated with a reduction in employment. This 
result holds in columns (6) and (7) as we include the other indicators. However, the coefficient 
on basic voice liberalisation is significantly reduced when the market share variable is included - 
                                                 
85 The coefficient is not very different from column (3) but has increased sufficiently to change from just not 
significant to just significant. 
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compare column (4) to column (7). These results suggest that liberalisation is important, but only 
to the extent that it actually leads to entry of new competitors. This accords well with theoretical 
and empirical results in the literature, as discussed earlier. Finally, the coefficient on partial 
privatisation is once again negative and significant in column (7) where we are controlling for 
aspects of liberalisation – compare column (7) to column (4).  
Table 37 shows the relationship between regulatory reforms and the level of labour productivity 
in telecommunications and postal services. We see here that both liberalization and entry have a 
consistently positive impact. In particular, liberalization of the mobile phone sector has led to 
increases of about 9% on average in the level of labour productivity. None of the other variables 
is ever significant. 
As was the case in the Electricity, Gas and Water Supply results, we found no significant results 
using the growth of labour productivity. As before, this indicates either that the main effects have 
been one-off changes in productive efficiency, or that our sample period is too short to pick up 
any impact on dynamic efficiency.  
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Table 37: Telecoms, level of labour productivity 
Dependent variable: ln (value 
added per worker) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) 
         






   -0.003 
(0.051) 




   0.067 
(0.057) 
















Market share of new entrants 
(trunk) 






         
Test that sum of privatisation 






   2.03 
(0.158) 
         
Observations:  138 138 138 138 138 138 138 
Countries:  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Years:  1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 1985-1997 
         
Note: Numbers in () are robust standard errors. All regressions include country and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at 10% level,** indicates significance at 5% level 
 
Unfortunately sample sizes are too small to allow us to look at the correlation between regulatory 
reforms and fixed capital formation, TFP or prices; data on gross fixed capital formation in the 
Post and Telecommunications sector has poor coverage across countries, and data on prices are 
only available from Eurostat for the 1997-2002 period, leaving only one year where we have 
both regulation and price data. 
 